T he article critiqued NATO’s Intervention in the 2011 Libyan Crisis as a test case for the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) from the perspective ofthe concept of sovereignty (the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia). Data for the study wascollected from secondary sources. It found that the 2011 Libya Intervention failed to address the fundamental triggers of the conflict. The aftermath of the intervention
has not justified the regime change. The enduring insecurity and mounting civilian casualty, the humanitarian emergencies that plague Libya, and the lawlessness and the impunity that contentious transitional arrangements have spawned continue to query NATO’s justification for the intervention. These dysfunctions contrast assertions that the UN-authorized intervention was to promote a just cause. Worse still, aftermath of the Libyan crisis has opened the flooded gates of religious militancy that threatens the Sahel and the littoral states of West Africa. It recommends for a greater AU agency in African crisis.