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Electoral Administration and the Role of the *Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)* in Nigeria's 2023 General Elections

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Abstract: *This study examined Electoral Administration and the Role of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria's 2023 General Elections, with a focus on how the commission's institutional framework, technological innovations, and operational strategies influenced the credibility of the electoral process. The objective was to assess the extent to which INEC's performance shaped public perceptions of democratic governance in Nigeria. The research was guided by **Electoral Governance Theory**, which emphasised the dimensions of rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication, providing a framework for evaluating electoral management effectiveness. The study adopted a qualitative methodology, relying on document analysis of official INEC reports, legal instruments such as the Electoral Act 2022, credible media publications, and scholarly literature on electoral administration in Nigeria. This approach enabled a contextual understanding of the interplay between institutional design, electoral technology including the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Results Viewing Portal (IReV)—and the operational realities of the 2023 general elections. Findings revealed that while INEC introduced significant technological reforms aimed at improving transparency, inconsistencies in technology deployment, logistical delays, allegations of voter suppression, and weak enforcement of electoral laws undermined public trust in the process. Political tensions and widespread contestations of results reflected deep-seated concerns about the commission's operational independence and effectiveness. The study recommended strengthening INEC's autonomy, ensuring uniform technology deployment nationwide, and enhancing staff training and logistics management. These measures were deemed essential to restoring credibility in Nigeria's electoral process and consolidating democratic governance.*

Keywords: Electoral administration, INEC, 2023 general elections, electoral governance, democratic credibility.

Introduction

Elections are a central pillar of democratic governance, functioning as the primary mechanism through which citizens participate in shaping political leadership and influencing policy direction (Norris, 2014). Beyond their procedural essence, elections embody the democratic ideals of representation, accountability, and inclusivity, ensuring that political authority derives from the consent of the governed (Diamond, 2019). Electoral administration, therefore, plays a decisive role in determining the credibility, transparency, and legitimacy of the electoral process. A well-structured electoral management system ensures not only the orderly conduct of elections but also the preservation of democratic stability (López-Pintor, 2000).

In Nigeria, electoral administration is entrusted to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the constitutionally recognised Election Management Body (EMB) responsible for organising,

supervising, and conducting elections to federal and state offices, as well as referenda (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). INEC's functions include voter registration, regulation of political parties, delineation of constituencies, and the conduct of civic and voter education (Omotola, 2010). The commission operates under a legal framework that encompasses the **Electoral Act 2022**, which provides guidelines on electoral timelines, technology deployment, campaign finance, and dispute resolution mechanisms (INEC, 2023).

Historically, Nigeria's electoral process has faced persistent challenges, including electoral malpractice, voter intimidation, logistical deficiencies, and judicial disputes over election results (Suberu, 2007). The First and Second Republics were characterised by irregularities that eroded public confidence in the electoral system. While the return to civilian rule in 1999 rekindled hopes for democratic

consolidation, subsequent elections in 2003, 2007, and 2011 drew criticism from domestic and international observers for failing to meet global standards of electoral integrity (EU EOM, 2011; Omotola, 2010). The 2015 general elections, however, marked a relative improvement, with the peaceful transfer of power to the opposition, raising expectations for further reforms.

Against this backdrop, the 2023 general elections were widely anticipated as a milestone in Nigeria's democratic development. INEC introduced several innovations aimed at enhancing transparency and reducing electoral fraud. These included the nationwide deployment of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) for verifying voters' identities through fingerprints and facial recognition, and the INEC Result Viewing (IReV) portal, designed to enable real-time public access to polling unit results (EU EOM, 2023). Such technological interventions were intended to address historical challenges such as

multiple voting, underage voting, and result manipulation (CDD, 2023).

Despite these measures, the 2023 elections were marred by operational shortcomings and allegations of malpractice. Reports from observer missions documented instances of late opening of polling units, malfunctioning BVAS devices, and inconsistent transmission of results to the IReV portal (EU EOM, 2023). Allegations of vote buying, voter suppression, and targeted intimidation were reported in several states, raising concerns over the inclusivity and credibility of the process (Human Rights Watch, 2023). These challenges generated significant political tension, with opposition parties disputing results and initiating legal proceedings, thereby deepening public mistrust in the electoral process (International Crisis Group, 2023).

The credibility of electoral administration is pivotal for sustaining Nigeria's democratic trajectory. INEC's role in the 2023 elections underscores both the progress and persistent shortcomings

in the country's electoral governance. While technological reforms demonstrated a commitment to modernising election management, the gap between policy intent and operational execution highlighted the fragility of public trust in electoral institutions. The controversies of 2023 not only reignited debates about electoral reform but also underscored the need for greater institutional capacity, neutrality, and transparency in Nigeria's electoral administration (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002).

This study is situated within this context, seeking to explore the interplay between electoral administration, the role of INEC, and the realities of Nigeria's 2023 general elections. It examines how the commission's institutional framework, technological innovations, and operational strategies influenced the credibility of the elections and the extent to which these shaped public perceptions of democratic governance in Nigeria.

Literature Review

Empirical studies on Nigeria's 2023 general elections have largely focused on the relationship between electoral administration, technological reforms, and public trust in democratic institutions. Observation reports and academic analyses revealed that while INEC introduced innovations such as the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) to enhance transparency, operational shortcomings and inconsistent implementation undermined the intended credibility gains. For example, Yiaga Africa's (2023) observation report, based on nationwide data collection from trained observers, found that BVAS reduced incidents of manual accreditation but also caused delays in some polling units due to technical malfunctions and inadequate troubleshooting capacity. Similarly, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM, 2023) documented that delayed uploads of presidential election

results to IReV created an information gap that fueled public suspicion.

Empirical analysis by Orji (2023), drawing on media monitoring and election observation datasets, highlights a significant decline in voter confidence post-election, particularly among younger voters who had initially expressed optimism about the reforms. This aligns with CDD's (2023) findings from field interviews and focus groups, which indicated that logistical challenges—such as late opening of polls and shortages of materials—were disproportionately experienced in rural and high-conflict zones, thereby exacerbating regional disparities in voter participation. Quantitative studies, such as Aiyede (2022), using survey-based data, show a strong correlation between perceived electoral fairness and willingness to engage in future political processes. These studies collectively suggest that while INEC's technological and legal reforms represent progress, empirical evidence points to the critical importance of operational efficiency

and institutional trust in shaping electoral legitimacy.

Although there is a growing body of empirical research on Nigeria's 2023 general elections, most existing studies approach the subject from fragmented angles, focusing on specific elements of the electoral process rather than examining it as an integrated system. Observation reports and academic analyses have paid significant attention to INEC's adoption of technological tools such as the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), as well as to operational shortcomings like logistical delays and voter suppression. However, these works tend to treat each factor in isolation, offering limited understanding of how INEC's institutional framework, technological innovations, and operational strategies interact to shape the credibility of elections and influence public perceptions of democratic governance.

First, there is a notable lack of research connecting INEC's

governance structure, its statutory independence, and resource allocation mechanisms directly to electoral credibility. The commission's institutional framework is the backbone of its capacity to manage free and fair elections, yet few empirical studies systematically explore how these structural factors enable or constrain performance in practice. Second, while the introduction of BVAS and IReV has been widely discussed, analyses often focus on their technical performance whether the devices worked as intended or whether results were uploaded on time without examining how the integration of these tools into INEC's operational and legal framework affected trust, transparency, and perceived legitimacy. This leaves a gap in understanding the broader governance implications of electoral technology adoption. Third, public perception studies have largely measured trust and satisfaction in the immediate aftermath of the elections. Few have gone further to assess how operational

successes or failures during the 2023 polls influence long-term public attitudes toward democratic governance, political participation, and institutional accountability. The limited exploration of these dynamics constrains the ability to draw deeper conclusions about democracy's trajectory in Nigeria.

Finally, much of the current literature is based on short-term election observation data, which, while valuable, cannot capture the evolving relationship between electoral administration and democratic legitimacy over time. This lack of longitudinal and interdisciplinary research limits a nuanced understanding of how structural, technological, and operational factors collectively determine electoral credibility and public trust. Addressing these gaps requires a holistic investigation that integrates institutional analysis, technology assessment, and operational evaluation, while also situating these within the broader discourse of democratic governance in Nigeria.

Such an approach will not only deepen academic understanding of electoral management but also provide actionable insights for strengthening future electoral processes.

Theoretical Framework

The study of Electoral Administration and the Role of INEC in Nigeria's 2023 General Elections can be anchored on several theoretical perspectives that help to explain the functioning, challenges, and implications of election management. Three notable theories are useful for this studies Electoral Governance Theory, Institutional Theory, and Democratic Consolidation Theory.

Electoral Governance Theory examines the processes, institutions, and actors that regulate the electoral process, focusing on the rules, resources, and oversight mechanisms that ensure electoral credibility (Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002). The theory identifies three main dimensions of electoral governance: rule-making (legislation and

regulations), rule application (administration and logistics), and rule adjudication (dispute resolution). In the Nigerian context, INEC embodies all three dimensions such as drafting guidelines, organising elections, and addressing electoral disputes. The theory underscores that the quality of electoral governance determines the legitimacy of election outcomes.

Institutional Theory, developed by scholars such as March and Olsen (1984), posits that the behaviour and performance of organisations, including electoral commissions, are shaped by formal rules, norms, and structures. In this view, INEC's actions are not only influenced by legal frameworks such as the Electoral Act but also by informal norms, organisational culture, and political pressures. Institutional strength, transparency, and autonomy become crucial determinants of how effectively elections are managed.

Democratic Consolidation Theory, advanced by scholars like Linz and Stepan (1996), focuses on the

processes by which a new or fragile democracy becomes stable and widely accepted as the “only game in town.” Free, fair, and credible elections are key components of democratic consolidation. The theory argues that consistent, credible electoral management builds citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, reducing the likelihood of regression to authoritarianism. In Nigeria, controversies surrounding INEC’s performance in 2023 raised concerns about the extent to which electoral management strengthens or undermines democratic consolidation. For this study, Electoral Governance Theory is adopted as the most suitable framework. This is because it directly addresses the mechanics of electoral administration and links institutional performance to the credibility of elections. It provides a structured way to analyse INEC’s institutional framework, technological innovations (e.g., BVAS, IReV), and operational strategies in the 2023 elections, while also assessing how these elements shaped public perceptions of electoral

credibility and democratic governance in Nigeria. By focusing on the dimensions of rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication, the theory allows for a comprehensive evaluation of both the legal and practical aspects of INEC’s role.

Electoral Administration, INEC, and the Realities of Nigeria’s 2023 General Elections

Electoral administration constitutes the backbone of democratic practice, shaping the manner in which citizens engage with the political process and how their choices are translated into governance outcomes. The quality of electoral administration is a decisive factor in determining the credibility of elections, which in turn influences the legitimacy of any democratic system (Norris, 2014). In Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) bears the constitutional responsibility for this delicate task. Its performance during the 2023 general elections—arguably the most anticipated polls in Nigeria’s recent history—offers a complex

picture of reformist aspirations, technological innovations, logistical challenges, and political contestation (European Union Election Observation Mission [EU EOM], 2023).

Electoral administration encompasses both the legal and institutional frameworks that govern elections and the operational processes that make voting possible. Scholars such as López-Pintor (2000) and Birch (2011) stress that its success depends not only on robust rules but also on competent execution. In a state like Nigeria, where political competition is intense and public trust in institutions is fragile, the task of electoral administration is particularly sensitive. INEC's work is grounded in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the Electoral Act 2022, which stipulates its mandate to register political parties, conduct elections into federal and state offices, delineate constituencies, and engage in voter education (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Electoral Act, 2022). The commission operates

through a decentralised structure, with a national headquarters in Abuja and resident electoral commissioners in all 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. This design is meant to combine national oversight with local responsiveness, though questions about INEC's operational independence have long persisted (Omotola, 2010).

In preparation for the 2023 general elections, INEC introduced reforms that many observers hailed as transformative. The most prominent of these were the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing (IREV) portal. BVAS was intended to curb longstanding problems of electoral malpractice by verifying voters' identities through both fingerprints and facial recognition, thereby reducing incidents of multiple voting, underage participation, and impersonation (INEC, 2023a). The IREV portal, in turn, promised to enhance transparency by enabling the public to view polling unit results in real time, effectively allowing citizens

to monitor the collation process (Yiaga Africa, 2023). Alongside these technological innovations, INEC implemented an expanded Continuous Voter Registration exercise, which integrated digital tools to process and store voter data more efficiently. These measures, taken together, seemed to signal a break from the opacity and irregularities that had marred many past elections in Nigeria (Aiyede, 2022).

The atmosphere in the run-up to the elections was one of cautious optimism. Civil society groups, political parties, and international partners such as the EU EOM commended INEC for its commitment to modernising the electoral process. However, they also warned that technology alone could not overcome entrenched weaknesses, such as inadequate enforcement of electoral laws, political interference, and logistical shortfalls (EU EOM, 2023; Orji, 2023). These warnings proved prescient once voting commenced.

Election day in February 2023 was marked by a mixture of commendable innovations and frustrating failures. Reports from across the country indicated widespread delays in the opening of polling units, with some stations failing to commence voting until several hours after the scheduled time due to the late arrival of officials and materials (Centre for Democracy and Development [CDD], 2023). In certain rural and riverine areas, difficult terrain compounded these logistical delays, while security concerns in states such as Borno and Zamfara further hindered operations. The performance of BVAS was uneven: in many polling units, the device worked as intended, speeding up accreditation and bolstering confidence in the process; in others, technical glitches led to prolonged queues, voter frustration, and, in some cases, disenfranchisement (Yiaga Africa, 2023).

Perhaps the most damaging setback was the failure of INEC to promptly upload presidential election results to the IReV portal, despite repeated

assurances that results would be transmitted in real time (EU EOM, 2023). While the commission successfully uploaded many results from the National Assembly elections, the presidential uploads experienced unexplained delays. This discrepancy quickly fuelled suspicion among political actors and the public, with opposition parties alleging manipulation. The delay in communication from INEC worsened the situation, as it left room for speculation and conspiracy theories to gain traction (Orji, 2023).

The elections were also marred by targeted incidents of voter suppression and violence. In certain parts of Lagos, Rivers, and the South-East, there were reports of intimidation aimed at discouraging voters from particular ethnic or political backgrounds (CDD, 2023). In some areas, the presence of security forces was inadequate, allowing disruptions to go unchecked; in others, heavy security deployment was seen as excessive and intimidating. Such incidents

undermined the inclusivity of the electoral process and cast doubt on whether the elections truly reflected the will of the people in all parts of the country.

When results were announced, several opposition candidates rejected them outright, citing discrepancies between polling unit-level tallies and the official figures released by INEC (Yiaga Africa, 2023). Legal challenges followed, with the presidential election outcome contested at the election tribunal and eventually reaching the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, public opinion surveys indicated a sharp decline in trust towards INEC. Many Nigerians felt that the commission had failed to meet its own standards, especially regarding the transparent use of IReV, even if certain logistical and technological improvements compared to past elections were acknowledged (Aiyede, 2022).

The interplay between electoral administration, INEC's institutional role, and the realities of the 2023 elections thus reflects a wider tension

between aspiration and execution. On paper, the reforms introduced under the Electoral Act 2022 and the deployment of BVAS and IReV represented a serious effort to enhance electoral integrity. In practice, the uneven implementation of these measures, compounded by technical failures, logistical gaps, and politically charged contexts, meant that the reforms' potential was only partially realised (EU EOM, 2023). INEC's position at the centre of this process—responsible both for the legal architecture and operational delivery of elections—made it the target of both praise for innovation and criticism for lapses.

Technology in this context proved to be a double-edged sword. While BVAS and IReV could have served as powerful tools to improve credibility, their inconsistent performance became focal points for contestation, illustrating that electoral integrity cannot rest solely on digital solutions. Instead, robust institutional capacity, adequate training, efficient logistics, transparent communication, and

political will remain indispensable (Omotola, 2010). In a polarised political environment, even minor administrative lapses risk being interpreted as deliberate bias, thereby eroding trust in the system.

The credibility of Nigeria's democratic process depends on whether citizens believe elections are free, fair, and transparent. If electoral administration consistently falls short of these expectations, it risks deepening political apathy, particularly among the youth, and fuelling instability (Norris, 2014). The 2023 elections underscore the urgent need to strengthen INEC's operational capacity, protect its independence from political interference, and ensure strict enforcement of electoral laws. Equally important is timely and transparent communication with the public, which can help counter misinformation and rebuild confidence in electoral processes.

Ultimately, the experience of the 2023 general elections reveals that Nigeria's democratic project remains

a work in progress. INEC's reforms were ambitious and, in many respects, forward-looking, yet the gap between institutional aspiration and electoral reality remains wide. Bridging this gap will require more than legal reforms or technological upgrades; it will demand sustained investment in the human, logistical, and institutional foundations of electoral administration. Only then can Nigeria hope to conduct elections that not only meet procedural standards but also command the genuine confidence of its people.

INEC's Institutional Framework, Technological Innovations, and Operational Strategies: Implications for Electoral Credibility and Democratic Governance in Nigeria's 2023 General Elections

The credibility of electoral processes in any democracy depends on the interplay between institutional design, the deployment of innovations, and the execution of operational strategies. In Nigeria, the Independent

National Electoral Commission (INEC) serves as the central electoral management body mandated to organise and oversee all federal and state elections. The 2023 general elections were a critical test of INEC's institutional resilience, given widespread demands for transparency, the adoption of new technologies, and the volatile political environment. This essay examines how INEC's institutional framework, technological innovations, and operational strategies shaped the credibility of the 2023 elections and influenced public perceptions of democratic governance.

INEC's institutional framework is rooted in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and further elaborated in the Electoral Act 2022. These legal instruments grant INEC independence in decision-making, empower it to register political parties, delineate constituencies, conduct voter education, and enforce electoral rules (Electoral Act, 2022; Constitution of Nigeria, 1999). Its decentralised

structure—with a national headquarters, state-level Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs), and local government offices—was designed to combine national oversight with localised operational capacity (Omotola, 2010).

However, the commission's institutional autonomy has long been questioned. While legally independent, it is funded through the national budget and its leadership is appointed by the President, raising concerns about susceptibility to political pressure (Aiyede, 2022). Before the 2023 elections, INEC undertook significant legal reforms in line with the Electoral Act 2022, introducing provisions for electronic accreditation, result transmission, and stricter timelines for dispute resolution. These reforms were intended to strengthen the credibility of elections and minimise manipulation during collation. Nevertheless, as observed by the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM, 2023), the credibility of any electoral body

depends not only on its legal mandate but also on the consistent and impartial execution of that mandate.

The 2023 general elections marked the most extensive use of electoral technology in Nigeria's history. Two major innovations defined the process: the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing (IReV) portal. BVAS was designed to verify voters' identities through fingerprint and facial recognition, thereby reducing multiple voting, impersonation, and underage participation (INEC, 2023a). Its deployment aimed to address a long-standing weakness in Nigerian elections: inflated voter accreditation figures. In many polling units, BVAS performed effectively, streamlining accreditation and improving confidence in the integrity of the process (Yiaga Africa, 2023). However, in others, technical glitches and battery failures caused delays, long queues, and in some cases disenfranchisement.

The IReV portal was intended to enhance transparency by publishing polling unit-level results in real time. Prior to the election, INEC assured the public and political stakeholders that all results would be promptly uploaded, allowing citizens to cross-verify collation figures (INEC, 2023a). While the platform functioned well during state and legislative elections, the presidential election results experienced significant delays in upload, prompting suspicion and allegations of manipulation (Orji, 2023). The inability to fulfil this critical promise had an outsized impact on perceptions of credibility, as it clashed with public expectations and created an information vacuum exploited by misinformation.

Beyond technology, operational strategies were central to the 2023 elections. INEC invested in training ad-hoc staff, expanding voter registration through the Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) exercise, and improving logistics planning. The commission also worked closely with

security agencies through the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES) to mitigate electoral violence.

Despite these measures, significant operational gaps persisted. Logistical failures—such as late arrival of materials and officials—were widely reported, particularly in rural and riverine areas (Centre for Democracy and Development [CDD], 2023). Insecurity in states such as Borno, Zamfara, and parts of the South-East disrupted voting, while incidents of voter intimidation in Lagos and Rivers undermined inclusivity. These lapses reduced the effectiveness of otherwise progressive reforms and raised questions about INEC's capacity to manage large-scale elections in challenging environments.

The combination of logistical shortcomings, technological glitches, and perceived communication failures created a dissonance between the reforms promised and the experience of many voters. As the EU EOM (2023) noted, even limited operational

breakdowns can overshadow positive developments, particularly in politically polarised societies where suspicion is already high.

Public perceptions of democratic governance are deeply shaped by the perceived integrity of elections. Norris (2014) argues that electoral credibility is a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy; when citizens doubt the fairness of elections, trust in institutions erodes. In Nigeria's 2023 elections, the public initially embraced INEC's reforms with optimism, seeing BVAS and IReV as tools that could finally deliver transparent results. However, the inconsistent implementation of these innovations and operational shortcomings tempered this optimism.

Post-election surveys and observation reports indicated a decline in trust towards INEC, particularly among opposition supporters and younger voters (Yiaga Africa, 2023). While some acknowledged the progress made compared to previous elections, many felt that INEC failed to meet the

high expectations it had set for itself. This erosion of trust has implications for future democratic engagement, potentially contributing to voter apathy and weakening the perceived legitimacy of elected officials (Aiyede, 2022).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The 2023 general elections demonstrated both the potential and the limitations of INEC's institutional framework, technological innovations, and operational strategies. The legal and organisational structures provided a solid basis for credible elections, and the adoption of BVAS and IReV represented significant steps towards transparency. However, the gap between policy aspirations and operational realities undermined electoral credibility. In politically divided contexts, even isolated failures can disproportionately influence public perceptions, diminishing confidence in democratic governance. To strengthen credibility in future elections, Nigeria must not

only maintain legal reforms and technological tools but also invest in operational capacity, crisis communication, and safeguards for INEC's independence. Only then can the commission's innovations fully translate into democratic legitimacy and sustained public trust. INEC's autonomy should be fortified by insulating its funding, appointments, and decision-making processes from political interference. This may involve constitutional amendments to ensure that the commission's budget is released directly from the Consolidated Revenue Fund and that appointments of key officials undergo transparent, merit-based procedures vetted by non-partisan committees. The credibility of technological tools such as BVAS and IReV hinges on their uniform deployment and performance across all polling units. INEC should conduct extensive pre-election testing in diverse environments such as urban, rural, and remote and have contingency plans for areas with poor connectivity. Regular public demonstrations of the

technology can build familiarity and reduce suspicion. INEC must adopt an integrated logistics plan involving local transport providers, security escorts, and real-time tracking of election materials. Materials should be delivered to Registration Area Centres at least 24 hours before polls, with contingency stockpiles available in case of theft, damage, or delays. Partnerships with private sector logistics firms could complement INEC's internal capacity. INEC and relevant authorities must demonstrate zero tolerance for electoral offences such as vote-buying, intimidation, and ballot-box snatching. This requires strengthening the Electoral Offences Commission and ensuring that prosecutions are swift, visible, and applied equally, regardless of the political affiliation of offenders. Consistent enforcement reinforces the perception that the rules apply to all. Close collaboration between INEC, security agencies, and community leaders is essential to secure polling units in areas prone to violence. Special security deployment should

be guided by risk assessments, with measures such as early voter queuing, quick evacuation routes, and public assurances to voters about their safety. Post-election security should also be considered to prevent reprisals or unrest. INEC, civil society organisations, and the media should intensify voter education campaigns that explain voting procedures, the role of technology, and the importance of participation. Civic education should be continuous, not limited to election periods, and should target vulnerable groups such as women, youths, and persons with disabilities to ensure inclusive participation.

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