



# Geopolitical Power Struggles and Regional Sovereignty: A Historical Analysis of Russia-Ukraine Relations since 1991

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**Abstract:** The result of combining modern development with a complicated historical backdrop is the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. The desire for war and bloodshed has never come from any nation-state or population; rather, it has come from selfish people in positions of authority who are unaware of the implications of their influence. This article throws more light on the understanding of both Russia's and Ukraine's historical backgrounds from the imperial era to the USSR to the complex history that unites and divides them. It went further to address Ukraine's turbulent post-independence history and their relationship that speaks volumes about the struggle at hand, from the 10<sup>th</sup> - 19<sup>th</sup>, early 20<sup>th</sup>, soviet, post-soviet, and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, among other eras, with their historical disagreement and implication of the war lead to the global issue. For the benefit of clarity, however, the theory of realism in international relations is modified to explain the situation more in line with their perspective of the conflict and makes contributions on the part of Ukraine, Russia, the US, NATO, and the EU about the implications and potential for ending conflict and war. Because of the underlying tensions, which are financial and economic, and also the timing of the conflict is a major worry to the international community, it is impossible to ignore the global shift in the global economic order, lessons learned and solutions toward the war negotiation in Ukraine and Russia.

**Keywords:** Ukraine, Russia, United States, NATO, European, Power Dynamic.

## Introduction

The internal conflict, foreign domination,

and decades of violence have put Ukraine in a precarious position between the East

and the West. After the invasion, the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine continued for a year. There have been millions more displaced Ukrainians, and hundreds of thousands more military and civilian deaths have been reported on both sides (Freedman, 2023). What circumstances gave rise to the current unrest? This is a look at rival neighbors complicated and lengthy history.

After the Soviet Union declined in 1991, Ukraine became a sovereign nation. Nevertheless, according to Adrian Karatnycky, a former fellow at the US Atlantic Council and expert on Ukraine, uniting the country proved difficult. These divides were brought to light in 2004 when thousands of Ukrainians participated in the Orange Revolution, calling for greater European integration. Russia invaded and seized Crimea in 2014. Soon after, the People's Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk—backed by Russia—were established as a result of a separatist movement in the eastern Ukrainian territory of Donbas. Given the region's volatile past, the two countries are immersed in battle again today (Conant, 2023).

Russia and Ukraine have a turbulent past that began in the tenth century—both share comparable cultural backgrounds. However, the two countries' political and cultural identities have separated. Kyiv has consistently resisted Moscow's attempts to establish its domination over the nation, despite Moscow's constant insistence that Ukraine has always been a part of Russia. Despite the animosity between the two nations, Ukraine was a component of the Soviet Union for more than 70 years. Kyiv has regularly accused Moscow of meddling in its domestic affairs during the previous 20 years (Herd & Moustakis, 2000).

The Russia-Ukraine war has drawn the attention of both scholars and

policymakers because of its complex geopolitical entanglement, which calls for a thorough examination grounded in the many different theories of international relations (Wolff, H., 2023). The war between Russia and Ukraine, which intensified in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea, is now more than just a regional disagreement; it has global implications. By demonstrating how regional conflicts can escalate into more significant global crises, this clash defies conventional wisdom in international affairs.

Fundamental issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the balance of power in a world growing more interconnected are at the core of the conflict, and the tension between Russia's assertive actions and Ukraine's fight to defend its sovereignty exemplifies the complexities of contemporary state behavior in a multipolar international system (Ferguson, 2014). The annexation of Crimea and the ongoing hostilities in Eastern Ukraine have not only changed the political landscape of Eastern Europe but also strained relations between global powers.

One among the prominent theories of international relations, realism, offers useful analytical frameworks for comprehending the intricacies of this dispute. With its emphasis on state security and power politics, realism interprets Russia's actions as a component of a larger plan to keep control of its immediate geopolitical neighborhood. Russia's military engagements are primarily motivated by its geopolitical objectives, especially its wish to use NATO expansion to defend its borders against Western intrusion. Realists contend that Russia's aggressive stance is a logical reaction to the perceived danger presented by Western

nations and its shrinking sphere of influence (Bajpai, 2023). According to this idea, Russia's quest for dominance is not exceptional; rather, it is a component of a larger pattern of state conduct in which security considerations influence policy choices.

This study explains the dispute between Russia, Ukraine, the US, NATO, and the EU and its consequences for ending conflict and war, as well as offering insights for resolving future issues. The article focuses on historical patterns and applies the theory of realism in international relations. A thorough assessment of the literature, including scholarly articles, policy papers, textbooks, and official reports from international organizations, forms the basis of the qualitative methodology. Russia's geopolitical moves, strategic goals, and military actions are the main subjects of the realist perspective. The analysis of primary sources, including official declarations, historical information on Russia-NATO relations, and academic publications on Russian foreign policy, sheds light on how Russia's actions conform to Realist concepts of power, security, and territorial domination (Ferguson, 2014).

### **Defining the Core Issue**

Understanding how classic power politics and contemporary international diplomacy connect is made extremely difficult by the Russia-Ukraine crisis (Nychyk, A., 2022). The situation has worsened despite numerous attempts to resolve the dispute through diplomatic interventions, ceasefire agreements, and sanctions; neither side has been able to reach a long-term accord. The conflict between Ukraine's demand for international assistance, especially from organizations like NATO and the

European Union, and Russia's ambition for regional supremacy lies at the core of this problem. The geopolitical divide has been widened by these competing objectives, making the crisis a global issue that affects more than simply the two participating nations (Benedikter, 2023).

### **Russia and Ukraine's Historical Evolution: From the Imperial Era to the USSR**

This is the history of Russia and Ukraine's long and turbulent relationship over the past millennium, spanning from the Imperial to the USSR and post-Soviet eras. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 highlighted the diplomatic relations between the two nations. The dispute over Ukraine's sovereignty results from a complex problem with a long history in the region. Ukraine was not recognised as a sovereign nation during the Middle Ages. Instead, Kyiv served as the seat of government for the Kyivan Rus state, which comprised portions of modern-day Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. This may have led to the invasion in 2022 since the city has a hold on people's imaginations that extends beyond modern-day Ukraine. In the early modern era, the Rus peoples of what is now Ukraine sided with the Leaders of Moscow and later the first Russian tsars. Due to the devastation caused by World War II and the Soviet Union's rise, Ukraine would eventually have challenges in the 20th century due to its link to Russia (Lewis, 2023).

The 19th century saw the emergence of a more comprehensive Ukrainian identity that is closely linked to the area's Cossack heritage. At this time, Russians continued to see Belarussians and Ukrainians as members of the Russian ethnic group, referring to them as "Little Russians" alike. In 1804, the Russian Empire banned language training in schools as a

means of suppressing the separatist movement that was gaining traction in Ukraine. The Crimean War rocked the province from October 1853 to February 1856. The Russian Empire was opposed by a coalition that included the Ottoman Empire, France, and the United Kingdom. It saw the fights of Alma and Balaclava, the Light Brigade, and Florence Nightingale's involvement that led to the professionalization of nursing before the struggle was concluded by the Siege of Sevastopol, a crucial Black Sea naval station.

Following the fall of the Russian Empire, Russia was prohibited from basing naval forces in the Black Sea by the terms of the Treaty of Paris, which was signed on March 30, 1856. As a result of its humiliation, the Russian Empire and internal reforms to keep up with other European nations. Because of the continued state of affairs in Ukraine, the 1804 ban on teaching the language was extended in 1876 to include a ban on book printing or importation, play staging, and lecture delivery in Ukraine. During the Russian Revolution in 1917, Ukraine briefly experienced independence but soon acceded to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With its founding, the USSR established itself as a significant actor in international affairs during most of the 20th century (Lewis, 2023).

The USSR, Russia, and Ukraine were two signatories to the USSR's founding treaty in 1922. Thanks to its vast, green plains that produced food and grain, Ukraine became known as the "breadbasket" of the Soviet Union and was an essential part of the USSR. That fact just made the subsequent events more disturbing. The Holodomor, a state-sponsored famine, was a genocide carried out in Ukraine by the Joseph Stalin administration. Crops were seized and exported to pay for

Stalin's industrial and economic projects. Animals, including pets, were taken out. Soviet forces ensured that whatever remained was kept hidden from the people, causing up to 4 million Ukrainians to die from starvation deliberately. During World War II, Germany invaded Ukraine, crossing the border on June 22, 1941, and seizing power by November. Four million Ukrainians were evacuated to the east. The Nazis encouraged cooperation by creating the appearance that they backed an independent Ukrainian state, but they soon betrayed their promises after seizing control. Nazi soldiers killed almost 1.5 million Jews residing in Ukraine between 1941 and 1944. A counteroffensive was started throughout Ukraine in the wake of the USSR's victory at the Battle of Stalingrad in early 1943, and Kyiv was retaken in November of that year. After a bloody and challenging fight, Nazi Germany was driven out of western Ukraine by the end of October 1944. During World War II, 5–7 million Ukrainians perished. A famine that struck in 1946–1947 claimed the lives of about a million more people, and food production did not recover to pre-war levels until the 1960s (Lewis, 2023).

1954 saw the USSR relinquish control of Crimea to Soviet Ukraine. The action raised concerns about the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union, even though there may have been a mindset that, given the USSR's might, it did not matter which Soviet state reigned over which territory. On April 26, 1986, a nuclear catastrophe occurred in Ukraine at Chernobyl. A decrease in power caused reactor number 4 to become unstable during a test procedure. After the core melted down, it completely demolished the building. The only two nuclear catastrophes to achieve the highest rating are Chernobyl and the Fukushima

accident in 2011 (Lewis, 2023).

### **The Complicated Past that Both Brings Russia and Ukraine Together and Divides Them.**

Some of the worst catastrophes ever impacting Ukraine occurred in the 20th century. Following the 1917 communist revolution, Ukraine was one of many countries integrated into the Soviet Union in 1922. To force peasants to labour on collective farms, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin orchestrated a famine in the early 1930s that resulted in the starving deaths of millions of Ukrainians. Stalin then assisted in the repopulation of the East by bringing in large numbers of Russians and other Soviet citizens, many of whom had little or no connection to the region and did not speak Ukrainian well (Conant, 2023). Irreversible fault lines are the result of these historical legacies. Because they were under Russian administration for a longer period than people in the West, people in the east of Ukraine have greater ties to Russia. They are more likely to support politicians who lean towards Russia. In contrast, because the Empire, Poland, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire dominated their area for many years, Ukrainians in western Ukraine have traditionally favoured leaders who tilt more toward the West. The population in the east is frequently more Russian-speaking and Orthodox than in the west, are pockets of more Ukrainian-speaking and Catholic residents. After the Soviet Union declined in 1991, Ukraine became an independent nation. Nevertheless, uniting the country proved to be a difficult task. These divides were brought to light in 2004 when thousands of Ukrainians participated in the Orange Revolution, calling for greater European integration. Russia invaded and seized Crimea in 2014. Soon after, the People's Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk—backed by

Russia—were established as a result of a separatist movement in the eastern Ukrainian territory of Donbas. Given the region's volatile past, the two countries are more.

### **The Erratic History of Ukraine Since Gaining Independence**

Leonid Kravchuk, the leader of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, declared his nation's independence from Moscow in 1991. In a referendum and presidential election, Kravchuk was elected president by the vast majority of Ukrainians, who also strongly wanted independence. Leonid Kuchma took over as president in 1994. Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom also signed the Budapest Memorandum, which obliges Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal—the third largest in the world—in exchange for security guarantees based on respect for its independence and sovereignty (Jones, 2023).

**2004:** Pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich wins the presidency, but allegations of vote-rigging lead to the Orange Revolution, which sparks protests and necessitates a new election. The winner of the former prime minister Viktor Yushchenko, who favored the presidential election and favoured Western ideas.

**2005:** Yushchenko takes power, promising to steer Ukraine away from the Russian Federation and toward the EU and NATO. He appointed Yulia Tymoshenko, a former CEO of an energy company, as prime minister; however, she was dismissed because of internal conflict within the pro-Western side.

**2010:** Yanukovich defeats Tymoshenko in a presidential runoff. Russia and Ukraine finalised a gas pricing agreement for extending the lease for the Russian navy at a Black Sea port on the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine.

**2013:** Months of massive demonstrations

in Kyiv began after Yanukovych's government chose to resume trade and association talks with the EU in November rather than pursuing economic ties with Moscow. According to Putin, the West is both causing and endorsing the protests.

**2014:** The protests primarily take place in Kyiv's Maidan Square go violent. Several protestors are killed. In February, the parliament votes Yanukovich out, and he flees. Days later, armed men stormed the parliament building in Crimea and raised the Russian flag. Moscow annexes the area in a referendum on March 16, which is overwhelmingly in favour of annexing Crimea to Russia. In April 2014, pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's eastern Donbas area proclaimed their independence. The conflict begins and continues on and off until 2022, even after multiple ceasefires.

**July 2014:** A passenger jet, MH17, is shot down by a missile over eastern Ukraine while it was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, killing all 298 persons on board. Investigators discovered that the weapon originated in Russia, which denies any involvement.

**2017:** The EU and President Petro Poroshenko, a pro-Western billionaire businessman who has been in power since May 2014, signed an association agreement on free trade of goods and services. but also, Ukrainians can now enter the EU without a visa.

**2019:** With promises to combat systemic corruption and end the violence in eastern Ukraine, former actor Volodymyr Zelenskiy upsets Poroshenko in an April presidential election. In July, there was a parliamentary election, which his Servant of the People party won.

**2021:** Zelensky pleads with US President Joe Biden to let Ukraine join NATO in January. Russia gathers a sizable contingent of soldiers near Ukraine's

borders in the spring, claiming the actions are training exercises. In December, Russia issued several security requests, one of which is that NATO formally commit to ending all military activities in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. NATO's response is reiterating its "open-door" policy and offering "pragmatic" discourse on Moscow's security concerns.

**2022:** The West is imposing additional economic restrictions on Russia. On February 24, Putin declared war in a speech delivered before daybreak. Russia then launches a three-pronged invasion of Ukraine, using artillery and missiles to target cities and air bases mobilization. Thousands of people escape their homelands when Zelenskiy orders a nationwide mobilisation (Jones, 2023).

**Table 1:** Brief summary of Ukraine's turbulent history since independence

<b>2004</b>	Viktor Yanukovich won the presidency in 2004, held on November 21, which led to integration and civil war, resulting in the orange revolution, which sparked protests and necessitated a new election. Viktor Yanukovych is the president and he favours Western ideas.
<b>2005</b>	Yushchenko promised to steer Ukraine away from the Russian Federation and toward the EU and NATO. He appointed Yulia Tymoshenko, a former CEO of an energy company, as prime minister; however, she was dismissed because of internal conflict within the pro-Western side.
<b>2010</b>	Yanukovich defeats Tymoshenko in a presidential runoff. Russia and Ukraine finalised a gas pricing agreement for extending the lease for the

	Russian navy at a Black Sea port on the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine.
<b>2013</b>	Months of massive demonstrations in Kyiv began after Yanukovych's government resumed trade and association talks with the EU in November rather than pursuing economic ties with Moscow.
<b>2014</b>	The protest that took place in Kyiv's Maidan Square turned violent. Several protectors are killed. The parliament votes Yanukovich out in February, and he flees. Armed men storm the parliament building in Crimea and raise the Russian flag. In a referendum on March 16, Moscow annexes the area in favor of Russia. In April 2014, pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's eastern Donbas area proclaimed their independence, and this led to the continuation of the conflict.
<b>2017</b>	Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko on Friday signed an association agreement on free trade of goods and services, which gave Ukrainians access to enter the EU without a visa.
<b>2019</b>	Volodymyr Zelenskiy took on incumbent in Ukraine presidential run-off vote, 21 April 2019. Zelenskiy promised to fight corruption but upset Poroshenko in the April presidential election. In July, there was a parliamentary election, which the Servant of the People party won.

<b>2021</b>	Zelenskiy pleads with US President Joe Biden to let Ukraine join NATO in January. This brought about Russia gathering a sizable contingent of soldiers near Ukraine's borders in the spring, claiming the actions call for training exercises. In December, Russia issues security requests that NATO formally commit to end military activities in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. NATO's response is reiterating its "open-door" policy and offering "pragmatic" discourse on Moscow's security concerns.
<b>2022</b>	The West is imposing additional economic restrictions on Russia. On February 24, Putin's speech declare war. Russia then launches a three-pronged invasion of Ukraine, using artillery and missiles to target cities and air bases. Tens of thousands of people escape their homelands when Zelenskiy orders a nationwide mobilization.

## Russia-Ukraine Relations

Russia and Ukraine have a turbulent past that began in the tenth century. Ukraine and Russia both share comparable cultural backgrounds. Despite the animosity between the two nations, Ukraine was a component of the Soviet Union for more than 70 years. Kyiv has regularly accused Moscow of meddling in its domestic affairs during the previous 20 years. We review the contentious past of the two nations' relationship (Weisenfels, 2022).

### 1 - 10th - 19th century

The Origin: The modern countries of

Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine are said to have derived culturally from Kievan Rus, a medieval principality that was located in the Kievan Rus' region. Since the eleventh century, the Rus principality has been ruled by the Varangian Rurikid dynasty. The Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century brought about the fall of Kievan Rus, a principality. From the ninth century until the Mongol invasion in 1240, Kyiv was the capital of Russia. Moscow thereafter came to be the capital of the Russian Empire and the Muscovite Principality (Halperin, 2022).

**Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania:** In 1569, Kyiv became a member of this union. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lay between the two dominant European powers at the time, the Tsardom of Russia and the Kingdom of Sweden. The two nations that comprised the Commonwealth were the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland. Kyiv served as the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. **Imperial Russia's acquisition of Ukraine:** In 1783, Imperial Russia annexed Ukraine, largely without causing much violence. After the eager Cossacks from Ukraine had lived as a semi-independent nation since the early seventeenth century, the tsar was happy to have them join the Russian Empire. A little resistance was put up by the Ukrainians, but it was quickly annihilated. The purchase of Ukraine was one of the first steps in the Russian Empire's incursion into the Balkans and the Black Sea region.

## 2 - Early 20th century

**Suppression of Ukrainian culture:** In the 19th century, the Russian Empire started to suppress the Ukrainian language and culture. Integrating Ukrainians into Russian culture was the aim of this. The Russian Empire began relocating ethnic Russians into what is now Ukraine in the

eighteenth century. This pattern continued into the Soviet era. Because of this, the number of Russians residing in Ukraine increased from over 3.5 million in 1917 to over 34 million in 1989.

Ethnic Russians were sent to Ukraine to populate the region and strengthen its allegiance to the Russian Empire. This was an effort to bolster Russian authority over the area and enlarge the Russian Empire's borders.

Ukraine claimed independence by publishing the "Universal of the Ukrainian People" on January 22, 1917, the Ukrainian Central Rada (council) proclaimed Ukraine's independence inside the Russian federal state. On November 2, 1917, the council published a "Declaration of Independence of Ukraine" announcing the nation's independence. A few months later, on January 6, 1918, it was announced that the Ukrainian People's Republic had been established.

## 3 - The Soviet era

**Soviet Union founded:** During the Soviet-Ukrainian War (1917–1921), the Ukrainian Bolsheviks toppled the national administration in Kyiv and created the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). After that, Russia and the Ukraine SSR joined forces to form the founding member of the Soviet Union in 1922. Ukraine SSR became known as the breadbasket of Soviet Russia due to its rich soil and hospitable farming environment. Farmers in the country produced abundant food due to the ideal climate for agriculture.

**Industrialization of Ukraine:** The Ukraine SSR underwent industrialization during the Soviet Union's rule. Industries were constructed, and the country's agricultural sector was upgraded. The rapid industrialization that devastated a mostly agrarian community was the source of the Holodomor famine. A man-



made famine in Ukraine between 1932 and 1933 claimed the lives of about 3.5 million people. The Soviet government of Joseph Stalin was believed to have planned the famine.

Transfer of Crimea to Ukraine: In 1954, the Ukrainian SSR was granted sovereignty over Crimea by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Russia effectively lost control of the strategically important region to the Ukrainian SSR, as a result of this operation. The transfer was part of Khrushchev's aim for a politically united Soviet Union. It of Russia and Ukraine's centuries-long animosity and competition for the territory.

#### 4 - Post-Soviet era

Independence: When Ukraine decided to leave the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, there was much excitement about it. There were mass demonstrations in support of Ukrainian independence, like the 300,000-person human chain. The movement, which backed Ukrainian independence and stretched over 600 kilometers from Lviv to Kyiv, is estimated to have attracted over 1.5 million members. Later that year, more than 90% of people supported independence in a referendum. Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk became the first president of an independent Ukraine when he assumed office in 1991. 1994 marked the end of his term.

Nuclear demobilisation: Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine acquired a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons. The arsenal ranks third in the world when combined with the capacity to produce and build new weapons. In 1994, Ukraine vowed to ratify the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and begin destroying the weapons. On December 5, 1994, the Budapest Memo was signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, and Ukraine. Under the terms of the

agreement, Ukraine was granted security guarantees along with its accession to the NPT as a state without nuclear weapons.

#### 5 - 21st century

Orange Revolution: In response to Viktor Yanukovych's victory in 2004, a wave of political protests Putin also erupted in Ukraine. The protesters claimed that Yanukovych had unfairly benefited from an unfair advantage in the election results. When the results were deemed invalid, a fresh vote was called. In the re-election, Viktor Yushchenko won with 52% of the vote.

November 21, 2013, saw the start of the Euromaidan protests after Viktor Yanukovych decided to forgo signing the EU Association Agreement in favour of stronger ties with Russia. Protests known as Euromaidan were sparked by the choice not to sign the accord. The protests were directed towards the pervasive misuse of power, defilement of civil liberties, and exploitation in the Ukrainian administration. The Ukrainian government fell apart after Viktor Yanukovych, the elected president, was toppled.

Annexation of Crimea: Crimea was formally absorbed into Russia as a federal territory in February 2014, following the establishment of pro-Russian Sergey Aksyonov's government there. The Supreme Council of Crimea was among the other strategically important structures that were taken over by Russian troops wearing masks.

Russia attacks Ukraine: In 2021, Russia started a military build-up along its border with Ukraine. The buildup continued despite warnings from other Western countries. On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his army to enter Ukraine (Nepal Foreign Affairs, 2022).

**Table 2:** Summary of the relationship between Ukraine and Russia

<b>10<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Century</b>	<p>Russia, Ukraine and Belarus all claim their cultural ancestry to Kievan Rus. A medieval principality that was located in the Kievan Rus region. Since the 10<sup>th</sup> century, the Rus principality was ruled by a Varangian dynasty, the Rurikids. The 13<sup>th</sup> century, the Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus led to the fall of the principality. During 19<sup>th</sup> century until 1240. Kyiv was the capital of Rus, until Mongols invasion. Moscow then became the capital of the principality of Muscovy and, later, Russia became the capital of the principality of Muscovy and, later, the Russian Empire. In 1569, the city of Kiev became part of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. The Commonwealth was a federation of two states: the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Kyiv, the capital city of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1783, Ukraine was annexed by imperial Russia in a largely bloodless event. The Ukrainian Cossacks were eager to join the Russian Empire, and the tsar was happy to have them. There is some resistance from the Ukrainians, but it was quickly put down.</p>
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	<p>The annexation of Ukraine is the first step of the expansion of the Russian Empire into the Balkans and the black sea region.</p>
<b>Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century</b>	<p>The Russian Empire suppressed the Ukrainian culture and language in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In order to bring Ukraine into the Russian culture. The process continues in the soviet period. As a result, the Russian population in Ukraine increased from approximately 3.5 million in 1917 to over 34 million by 1989. This was done to strengthen Russian control over the area and to strengthen Russian control over the area and extend the empire's border, on, on November 2, 1917. The council issued the "Declaration of Independence of Ukraine" and proclaimed the nation's sovereignty. Later, the establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic on January 6, 1918.</p>
<b>The Soviet Era</b>	<p>During the Soviet Ukrainian War (1917–1921), the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was established due to the defeat of a national government in Kyiv by Ukrainian Bolsheviks. Ukraine SSR joined hands with Russia to become the founding member of the Soviet Union in 1922. Ukraine</p>

	<p>SSR was able to meet this demand and became a major food supplier to the Soviet Union. Despite harsh conditions in soviet Ukraine during the 1930s, the republic experienced relative prosperity and rapid industrialisation. The Holodomor famine in Ukraine was under man-made artificial famine from 1932 to 1933 that claimed the lives of around 3.5 million people. The famine was believed to be engineered by the soviet government of Joseph Stalin. In 1954, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev handed over Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR This was the vision of Khrushchev to bring about a politically unified Soviet Union. It led to centuries of conflict and competition between Russia and Ukraine over territory.</p>	<p>He served till 1994. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to destroy the weapons and to join the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). On December 5, 1994, Ukraine, Russia, Britain and the US signed the Budapest memorandum. Under the memorandum, Ukraine was promised security assurances in connection with its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.</p>
<b>Post-Soviet Era</b>	<p>During the independence struggle, from the 1990s, there was massive support within Ukraine to defect. During the independence struggle, in the 1990s, there was massive support from Ukraine to secede from the Soviet Union. Later, a referendum was held and over 90 per cent of the people supported Independence. The first president of independent Ukraine in 1991 was sworn in his Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk.</p>	<p><b>21<sup>st</sup> Century</b></p> <p>The Orange Revolution, in 2024, was a result of protests during the election that was rigged by authorities in favour of Yanukovych, who had the support of Russian president Vladimir Putin. A re-election took place; Viktor Yushchenko won by securing 52% of the votes. Euromaidan protests were sparked due to the decision not to sign the agreement. The protests aim at widespread government corruption, abuse of power, and violation of human rights in Ukraine. Elected president Victor Yanukovych was ousted, and the Ukrainian government was overthrown. Annexation of. It Crimea, in February 2014, Russian troops took over the supreme council of Crimea and strategic location and pro-Russian Sergey Aksyonov's</p>

	<p>government was established in Crimea, and it was formally incorporated by Russia. Russia formally incorporated it as a federal subject. Russia Ukraine. In 2021, Russia started a and significant military buildup on the border with Ukraine. Despite warnings from other Western countries, the buildup continued. On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, ordered his troops to enter Ukraine.</p>
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### **The Current State of Relations Between Russia and Ukraine**

Russia and Ukraine currently have tense, violent ties that are frequently rooted in shared history. Russia has traditionally viewed Ukraine as a colony rather than a distinct country. Russia sees the alleged assault on its independence as a threat to its security. Thus, Ukraine has close connections with the West via NATO and the EU as a counterbalance. Consider the common heritage as a sentimental connection to the state once based in Kyiv. Russia continues to view Ukraine as vital. Russia and Ukraine combined in part in 2022, What the USA thought of Cuba in 1960. A global nuclear conflict was all but prevented by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. To avoid a recurrence of the darkest parts of 20th-century history, Russia and Ukraine need to develop a solid, long-term cooperation that both sides can support, even though it might be challenging to achieve.

### **The History Behind Ukraine and Russia's Disagreements**

Historians consider past events between the two countries to arrive at this conclusion in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, claims Jonathan Masters (2022). A great deal of what is happening now began with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union broke up into Russia and Ukraine after it collapsed. Historians believe Russia plans to continue holding political sway over the former Soviet states. Russia claims that the citizens of these states who have similar political beliefs ought to be safeguarded. A lot of areas wanted to be independent of Russia after the Soviet Union broke up. Ukraine was one of them. According to Campbell University history professor Dr. Jaclyn Stanke, Ukraine proclaimed its independence in 1991, the year the Soviet Union broke up into its component countries. Historians estimate that over 92% of Ukrainian voters approved of the nation's declaration of independence.

### **Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War**

As stated by Abrams (2023), the Russia-Ukraine confrontation has implications not only for US foreign policy but also for the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. The conflict has brought European defense into sharper focus, and immediately afterward, NATO and the US have once again emerged as the continent's security providers. It has not been entirely inconsequential, as the EU has assisted in coordinating European responses and providing financial support to Ukraine. However, as history has often demonstrated since 1945, Western Europe is helpless to protect itself and turns to NATO and the US for support.

The Baltic states and other Eastern European nations have looked to NATO and the United States for support since there is not and won't be a substitute. So, allow me to begin by stating that the

United States and its armed forces will probably always be the leaders and protectors of what is still called "The West." This is still valid today, as it was when Israel was established in 1948. In the context of the Middle East, I would argue that the conflict in Ukraine has had two significant effects.

First, as a result of Russia's issues in Ukraine, Iran and Russia are growing closer to one another. Everything started with the selling of Iranian drones, but it might also lead to the production of homemade weapons in Russia and the transfer of more ammunition. That alliance is critical given Iran's nuclear weapons program. The EU-3, the US, China, and Russia have already demonstrated a strong sense of unity in opposing Iran's nuclear weapons program. With the development of this new alliance between Iran and Russia, that has changed; it is now unknown how Russia would react, for example, if the UK, France, or Germany were to impose snapback, and whether it is genuinely against the Iranian program. Second, Russia is no longer as valuable an ally as it once was in the Middle East. Is anyone speculating whether Gen. Sisi will move Egypt away from the US and toward Russia? Of course, cooperation with Russia is possible in certain areas, and Putin can send the Wagner group into small-scale hostilities. However, as things are right now, Russia is not seen as a valuable and trustworthy global force. Because Ukraine is so far away, one could claim that the war has minimal impact in Asia, but I do not think that's accurate. Russia's aggression and the US response have intensified the impact of China's hostile posture under Xi Jinping, bringing Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia closer to the US. India as well, a country that was closer to Russia for a long time. We

witness a new change of alliances like the Quad, which consists of the US, Japan, Australia, and India, becoming even more significant (Abrams, 2023).

### **Global Shifts in the World Economic Order**

The global economic order is changing faster than expected due to the crisis between Russia and Ukraine. YU XIANG'S. The centennial change in global order has gained further impetus due to the situation between Russia and Ukraine. When paired with the pandemic's impacts, this conflict has accelerated the transition of the world economy from one dominated by the United States to one driven by the presence of multiple parallel systems. Deeper Discord Underneath the Conflict economic and financial tensions significant. The Russia-Ukraine conflict started as a result of underlying tensions, both economically and financially, and the timing of this conflict is a major source of concern for the international community. First, there is a natural rivalry between countries that export energy and those that import it. A complex historical context combined with contemporary development has resulted in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. At first glance, one could think that this is merely a conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Russia and the West—that is, the US and the EU—have engaged in a new series of direct clashes since the end of the Cold War. Russia's primary energy market has been Europe, and the export of energy has played a major role in the nation's economy. Furthermore, Ukraine benefited by acting as "a bridge" for energy import and export between the EU and Russia. Second, there is a deep-rooted conflict between the Russian energy exporting commercial model and the Western info economy model. Due to

recent measures taken by other countries to bar Russia from engaging with their economies and technologies, Russia's national economy is absorbing new technology significantly more slowly than that of other Western countries. In the meantime, the rapid development of new technologies and the expanding digital economy are assisting the Western economies in their shift from an industrial to an information economy. An additional disadvantage of an over-reliance on energy exports is that profits may be highly susceptible to changes in the global energy market. Russia's economic problems grew worse as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak's persistently low energy sector prices worldwide. By the end of December 2021, Yu Xiang, CISS 30, had shown us the pressure on China's economic growth, the standard of living and income of its citizens, and the level of aggregate prices to stabilise. In addition, the war has impacted the global supply of agricultural products, and the already extremely volatile commodities market is being further taxed by the rapidly increasing cost of food (Food and Agriculture Organization in the United Nations, 2022). Prolonged Impact There's a chance that the Russia-Ukraine war will linger longer than any other regional WWII fight. It will speed the process of transforming the global order by causing new divisions and alliances among nations. It might, first and foremost, hasten the creation of rival international marketplaces (Lau, 2022). Third, the conflict has accelerated the transformation of the world energy market. Europe has realized that it is essential to diversify its energy sources. On the one hand, this trend could lead to a more level and diversified global market for the production and use of energy.

## **The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and Its Great Power Dynamics**

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the revival of conventional warfare in Europe demonstrate that great power politics are here to stay. This was made clear during the UN Security Council meeting on Friday when Russia vetoed the resolution that the US, Albania, and three other countries had sponsored. Three countries (China, India, and the United Arab Emirates) abstained. Despite the diplomatic efforts, the US has been criticized for various post-Cold War regimes because the war in Ukraine has shown that the country has a cogent grand plan. In the last twenty years, U.S. policy has mostly been reactionary, unfocused, and focused on fighting terrorism and counterinsurgency, with little to no consistent funding for diplomatic and strategic initiatives at all levels. But along with new nuclear threats from the Kremlin, Russian aggression has also forced the US's allies, including Germany and Japan, to reassess their respective foreign and security policies. As the Security Council debate and international debates on sanctions have demonstrated, the war in Ukraine highlights the division among people who back President Putin, those who stand firm against Russia, and others who are in the center, ultimately backing Russia's conduct. While several states have loudly criticized the wars of the early 2000s and international conventions have been developed to avoid such unprovoked aggression, they have demonstrated no interest in proactively supporting Ukraine against the unjustifiable Russian invasion (IntelBrief, 2022).

Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown to be the revanchist many had predicted he would be since taking office in the late 1990s. His vehement tirade refuting Ukrainian history and statehood,

delivered on Russian state television, echoed many of his long-standing grievances regarding NATO expansion and the West's indifference to Russia's security concerns. It is evident from the large portion of his speech that he devoted to Ukraine that his animosity stems from that nation's pro-European leanings and its role in the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. But unlike in 1999, Putin has the support of other autocrats in 2022. China is hesitant to criticize Russia in public, despite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson saying on Thursday that "China did not wish to see what happened in Ukraine today (IntelBrief, 2022).

It's also possible that Putin felt more confident because the West did not react to the Syrian conflict, allowing him to test Russian weapons, tactics, and ideas before the rise of terrorist groups like ISIS threatened global security. Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine likely prompted urgent discussions in Helsinki and Stockholm on the benefits of joining NATO. The West has to expose Putin as an egotistical and unstable leader to deter his risky behavior and alert Moscow to the possibility of consequences in both Russia and Ukraine. Brave Russians need to speak out against his erroneous strategies as well (IntelBrief, 2022).

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Realism**

Morgenthau regards realism as a way of thinking about international relations and a useful tool for devising policies. However, some of the basic conceptions of his theory, and especially the idea of conflict as stemming from human nature, as well as the concept of power itself, have provoked criticism. International politics, like all politics, is for Morgenthau a struggle for power because of the basic human lust for power. But

regarding every individual as being engaged in a perpetual quest for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes—is a questionable premise. Human nature cannot be revealed by observation and experiment. It cannot be proved by any empirical research, but only disclosed by philosophy, imposed on us as a matter of belief, and inculcated by education (Korab-Karpowicz, 2023). In a global system without a centralized political authority, realism—including neorealism—focuses on enduring patterns of interaction. Because of this state of anarchy, internal politics, which is governed by a sovereign power, frequently follows a different logic than foreign politics. Realism differs greatly from other philosophical traditions. Although realists acknowledge the existence and importance of other disciplines and their experts, politics occasionally needs to be kept apart from morality, economics, and even the law.

According to realism, which has its roots in the writings of classical philosophers like Thomas Hobbes and Thucydides, the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no supreme authority that can control how states behave. States in this system are driven mostly by self-interest and aim to increase their security and power in order to survive in a cutthroat global marketplace. Hobbes' concept of the "state of nature" emphasizes the ongoing mistrust and fear amongst participants in anarchic systems, while Thucydides' observations on the Peloponnesian War show how power struggles frequently result in violence (Thucydides, 1972; Hobbes, 1996). These fundamental tenets of realism still guide studies of state conduct today, especially in conflict scenarios like the crisis between Russia and Ukraine.

The Realist perspective is closely aligned with Russia's activities in the crisis in Ukraine. Russia's military intervention in Eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 are viewed as calculated actions meant to safeguard important geopolitical resources, like control of the Black Sea (Kumar, 2023). From a Realist perspective, these steps are aimed at bolstering Russia's position against NATO's eastward expansion, which Russia regards as a direct danger to its regional supremacy and security. Realist theory holds that states frequently take drastic steps to regain control and safeguard their interests when they believe that their sphere of influence is at danger (Ferguson, 2014).

Furthermore, realists contend that Russia's aggressive foreign policy stems from a concern of losing control over former Soviet states and the growing influence of Western nations close to its borders. Moscow feels more vulnerable as a result of NATO's expansion near its borders, and it has taken aggressive measures to stop additional invasion. Russia wants to maintain a strategic buffer zone between itself and the West and regain its position as a major regional power by waging war in Ukraine (Ezzeldin, 2015). Russia's activities, according to this perspective, are not just reactive; rather, they are a component of a larger plan to safeguard its long-term geopolitical interests in chaotic international systems where security and power are crucial.

### **Critical analysis and insights**

Applying Realism to the Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine According to realism, Russia's activities in the crisis in Ukraine stem from a deep concern for its geopolitical interests and national security (Mamlyuk, 2015). According to realism, nations function in anarchic

international systems where maximizing power and preserving oneself are of utmost importance. According to this perspective, Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea was a calculated, preventative action meant to safeguard important military resources, especially the naval station at Sevastopol, which is essential to Russia's ability to project power in the Black Sea and beyond. Russia's marine capabilities have historically depended heavily on the Black Sea region, which is crucial to preserving its hegemony over Eastern Europe. In addition to bolstering its military, Russia's control of Crimea protects a key entry point that is essential to its strategic objectives (Ferguson, 2014). The necessity to stop NATO from further intruding on Russia's traditional sphere of influence served as the realist driving force for this action.

Realist academics also contend that Russia's ongoing engagement in Eastern Ukraine, which acts as a buffer zone between it and NATO, serves a similar geopolitical objective. Moscow sees letting Ukraine become influenced by the West as a direct danger to its security and regional supremacy. According to realism, Russia is acting to keep Ukraine from turning into a Western outpost along its border and preserve a vital geopolitical equilibrium. Hence, the conflict is a prime example of power politics in action, when nations compete to maintain their security and supremacy in a zero-sum game of international relations (Kumar, 2023; Bajpai, 2023). Russia is reaffirming its position as a regional power and sending a message to the West that it will not accept any more intrusion into its sphere of influence by becoming involved in the Ukraine conflict.

### **Methodology**

To understand the underlying motives and behaviors of the major players in the



Russia-Ukraine conflict, this study uses a historical patterns theoretical framework and the lenses of Realism. A thorough assessment of the literature, including scholarly articles, policy papers, textbooks, and official reports from international organizations, forms the basis of the qualitative methodology. Russia's geopolitical moves, strategic goals, and military actions are the main subjects of the realist perspective. The analysis of primary sources, including official declarations, historical information on Russia-NATO relations, and academic publications on Russian foreign policy, sheds light on how Russia's actions conform to Realist concepts of power, security, and territorial domination (Ferguson, 2014). This strategy makes it clearer how Russia's engagement in Ukraine is motivated by its worry about NATO aggression and desire to preserve regional primacy.

### **Conflict Analysis (2014–2022 and beyond)**

In February 2014, the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out. After Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity, Russia took control of and annexed Crimea. Then, in the eastern Donbas region, it supported Russian paramilitaries who attacked Ukraine's soldiers. In 2018, Ukraine declared the region to be under Russian occupation. (Patrick, 2018). Cyberwarfare and naval incidents also occurred during these first eight years of combat. The largest European conflict since World War II began in February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine in full and began to capture more of the country. The conflict has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and caused a refugee catastrophe.

Viktor Yanukovich, the pro-Russian president of Ukraine, was overthrown in

the Revolution of Dignity, which followed the Euromaidan protests in early 2014. Pro-Russian protests erupted in certain parts of southeast Ukraine shortly after unmarked Russian military seized Crimea. Russia swiftly annexed Crimea after a fiercely contested referendum. The Donbas war began in April 2014 when militants supported by Russia took control of towns and cities in Ukraine's eastern Donbas area and declared the DPR and LPR to be independent nations. Ukraine was unable to completely retake the region because Russia secretly provided the rebels with its own troops, tanks, and artillery. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Russia controlled the DPR and LPR starting in 2014, and the International Criminal Court ruled that the war constituted both a domestic and international armed conflict involving Russia (ICC, 2016). The Minsk II agreements, which Russia and Ukraine agreed in February 2015, were never fully carried out in the next years. Similar to trench warfare, the Donbas war devolved into a stagnant struggle in which ceasefires were frequently broken but the frontlines remained stationary (ECHR, 2023).

There was a significant Russian military buildup in the vicinity of Ukraine's frontiers, notably in neighboring Belarus, starting in 2021. Several times, Russian officials denied plans to attack Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, questioned Ukraine's legitimacy and voiced expansionist views. He insisted on preventing Ukraine from ever becoming a member of the NATO military alliance. Beginning in early 2022, Russia recognized the DPR and LPR as sovereign states. While Russian troops ringed Ukraine, Russian proxies increased their attacks on Ukrainian military forces in the Donbas.

Putin said on February 24, 2022, that

Russia had no intention of occupying Ukraine and ordered a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" the nation. The subsequent Russian invasion was denounced globally, and numerous nations contributed military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine while imposing sanctions on Russia. Russia gave up its early April assault to capture Kyiv due to strong opposition. The liberation of areas in the south and northeast by Ukrainian forces started in August. Russia said in September that it had annexed four partially-occupied regions, a move that was denounced globally. Between then and 2023, Ukraine's counteroffensives and Russia's offensives only slightly expanded their area. Alongside the invasion, Ukrainian and Ukrainian-backed forces have launched strikes in Russia, including a cross-border offensive into the Kursk region of Russia in August 2024. Russia has frequently targeted civilians located far from the battlefield with intentional and random attacks (BBC, 2022; Gall, ed, 2022; Bogner, 2022). In addition to initiating an investigation into war crimes, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Putin and many other Russian officials.

### Policy Implication

**Hybrid Conflict Settlement Strategy:** For long-term conflict settlement, a hybrid strategy that blends cooperative diplomacy and power balancing is required. Liberalist tools like international organizations, diplomatic discussions, and conformity to international standards should be used to address realist issues like the necessity of buffer zones and regional security. By addressing both the current security risks and the more general international norms at issue, this dual strategy provides a way to de-escalate the situation.

**Resolving Russia's Concerns and Strengthening Collective Security:** NATO and the EU must keep giving Ukraine security guarantees so that it can protect itself from invasion. To allay Russia's worries about NATO's growth, diplomatic measures must be taken in addition to this military assistance. While preserving Ukraine's right to self-defense, tensions might be reduced by establishing new regional security arrangements and implementing measures to foster confidence, including arms control or military transparency.

**Limited Ceasefires and Gradual Peace-Building:** In conflict-prone areas like Eastern Ukraine, establishing limited ceasefires may be the first step toward more comprehensive peace. Future negotiations may be facilitated by steps to increase trust between Russian and Ukrainian soldiers, possibly supervised by impartial foreign peacekeepers. These modest accords have the potential to progressively accelerate the process of reaching comprehensive peace agreements that tackle the more significant problems of security and territorial sovereignty.

**Accountable Economic and Humanitarian help:** The international community needs to help Ukraine's economic resilience by providing targeted assistance that sustains displaced people, rebuilds infrastructure, and fortifies democratic institutions. To guarantee that financial and humanitarian aid is provided efficiently and does not worsen conflict or corruption, open procedures should be established concurrently. Using diplomatic avenues to foster economic cooperation between Russia and Eastern Europe may also help to maintain stability over the long run.

Enhanced Multilateral Diplomacy: In order to mediate the crisis, international actors should step up their diplomatic efforts. This entails moving past sanctions and aggressively seeking organized talks that include important international actors including the European Union, the United Nations, and regional organizations. Establishing official diplomatic channels that provide Ukraine and Russia a place at the table guarantees that the concerns of all parties are taken into consideration. This strategy should emphasize striking a balance between Russia's security interests and Ukraine's sovereignty, encouraging compromise through constant communication.

### **Lessons Learned from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict**


Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine symbolizes yet another turning moment in terms of the international security system, major power dynamics, and global economic development. It is particularly important for thoughtful reflection in this tumultuous and uncertain time. There are numerous takeaways and implications from the Russia-Ukraine war for China-U.S. ties, but two stand out as particularly significant. First, the security dilemmas facing the superpowers must be thoroughly addressed. Large nations frequently have security concerns, which are just manageable rather than completely eradicated in the absence of an alliance. Various historical instances show that consistent strategic dialogues and measures to foster confidence are crucial in preventing mutual stereotypes from cementing individual dynamic perceptions of their opponents and, as a result, in continually refining understandings of each other's strategic

intentions. Another important factor was that the dilemma of mutual security was exacerbated by the domestic political climate in both countries. The design of the nation's political system, the checks and balances of power, and the involvement of stakeholders encouraged United States leaders to inflate the threats from abroad and to use them to strengthen their control at home. Similar to this, the Soviet Union's ideological interpretation of American actions and the Soviet hierarchy's strong desire to rule Eastern Europe caused the underlying security conflict between the two countries to intensify into a series of security confrontations that ultimately resulted in the full-fledged Cold War. It is the result of complex historical roots and realistic security interest entanglements, but it also shows how poorly the United States, NATO, and Russia have been able to handle the protracted security battle that supports the current Ukrainian administration.

### **Solution toward War Negotiation in Ukraine and Russia**

Renowned academics have contributed their insights on Russia and Ukraine. As per Irina Scherbakova, a Nobel Peace Prize winner that the solution to the conflict will now be a military one. She also surmised that diplomacy would eventually be involved in ending the crisis. This war has turned so many things upside down, it will never be like that again," she stated (WORLD NDTV, 2022). Richards emphasizes the split of land, saying that if the conflict lasts for a long time, it may be possible to divide Ukraine's territory along similar lines to the two Koreas or Cyprus and Turkey, which all have sizable demilitarized zones (Guillermo, 2022).

History demonstrates that communication may solve even the most difficult disputes. "To balance the competing interests of states and to find common denominators which could form the basis for an agreement" is the theoretical goal of negotiations. (Paul and others, 2004). Negotiations to avert a military conflict between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis served as an example. The situation highlights some timeless truths in conflict resolution, even after 60 years (Stern & Druckman, 2000).



**Figure 1:** Model of a possible progressive solution for resolving conflict

Resolving the conflicts between Ukraine and Russia can best be achieved through negotiations/dialogue that could lead to a ceasefire/workable agreement, bring about a solution/resolution, and finally result in peace. Peace negotiation is the process that reduces conflict, violence, and disagreements and advances the development of peace.

## Conclusion

Ever since the fall of the USSR, Russia and Ukraine have been at odds. The conflict between them began in 2014 and escalated into a full-fledged crisis before turning into a war in 2022. The main

reasons for the animosity are Russia's determination to regain its status as a superpower in the international arena, to make the Donbas region autonomous, and to include the Crimean territory in the Russian Federation. Serious consequences have also been caused by the crisis for Ukraine, the European Union, and the world at large. Since Ukraine depends on about 40% of its energy supply from Russia, which is now more severely affected, the country is experiencing both humanitarian and economic issues, while Europe as a whole is also experiencing economic turmoil. The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine could be seen as a contributing factor to Europe's demise if it is not addressed promptly. The international community must press both parties toward peace negotiations; if a military solution seems the better option, neither will sit down to negotiate. Regardless of Ukraine's course, the world needs to move from discussing war plans to discussing models for peace; the alternative is too risky.

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