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Politics of Financial Clientelism in Developing Democracies: Insights from Nigeria.

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Abstract: Political clientelism, locally known as godfatherism has been a recurring issue in the democratic practice of developing countries. It has become a key feature of Nigeria's democratic practice and has been adjudged by several literature as a bane towards good governance. The work focuses on the effects of godfatherism as well as the perceptions of the citizens of Kwara state, a state which has had a long history of acts of godfatherism in Nigeria and one which the citizens in the 2019 General elections denied the wishes of the godfathers with their votes. This was done using a descriptive survey method, using questionnaire as a means of data collection from 385 Krejcie and Morgan samples in the state. The data was analyzed using the regression mode of analysis. The research found significant impact of godfatherism on governance in Kwara state.

Keywords: godfatherism, politics, democracy, governance, Nigeria, Africa

Introduction

In most African countries, especially since the attainment of independence, political development has been riddled by several issues. One of the major ones is the political clientelism or master-servant relationship in governance known as godfatherism¹ which has been found to hinder political development and a huge stumbling block in the democratisation process in Nigeria (Ojo & Ohiole, 2016). Godfatherism is explained as a form of client-patron relationship between a politician and a prospective aspirant (Okoli, 2022). Thus, when the aspirant assumes position through a successful electoral campaign, the effect of the relationship often results to imposition, abuses, and exploitation from the former to the latter. These Godfathers often fund the expensive electoral process of their anointed candidates, thus leading to a reciprocity and endearment upon the success of the client.

Mamogale (2013) asserts that despite the struggle for independence by many African countries, only few were genuinely prepared for the process of self-rule. This is so because many of African states became victims of poor economic performance, ethnic and political violence, series of power tussle and military coups as well as poor institutional quality. In Nigeria, similar narrative can be accounted for. Nigeria became one of the earliest countries on the African continent to gain independence in 1960. However, the democratic rule practiced at independence was truncated several times in the next 40 years after independence. Each republic² was characterized by domestic challenges which led to its eventual demise. This was because the nature of Nigerian politics was characterized by ethnic and religious differences, all justling to attain

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and retain political power. Therefore, stakes were and have remained high in the political practice. Vices such as corruption, mismanagement of funds, by elected officials needed to be covered by their successors, thereby leading the incumbent to have a say in their replacement whom they trust to cover their illegal trails. Thus, leading to the case of a godfather and godson relationship.

The process of godfatherism begins from the process of becoming a political party candidate for an election, a feat which has fast been taken over by top executive officers including local government chairmen, governors, and presidents in their respective tiers of government. Most times, these top executives impose their candidates based on their wealth, relationship etc. on the other members of the party. For example, in the 2019 general elections in Oyo state, the eventual party candidate, Adebayo Adelabu who was a former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria was alleged to have paid the governor at that time a sum of 10 million dollars (3.57 billion Naira) to emerge as the eventual candidate (Sahara Reporters, 2018).

The process of becoming a political party's preferred choice of candidate is a process that requires patience, loyalty, and longevity, most importantly, what is commonly referred to as 'money politics', a process where financial strength reaffirms loyalty of party stalwarts. Several candidates by virtue of their relationship with their godfathers have been able to overcome these barriers. These may be through legitimate means which include financial superiority as demonstrated above. Others may be through non-existing internal democracy which often affects

women (Oguadimma, Nwakalor & Ejinkeonye, 2021; CDD, 2019; Amina & Ibrahim, 2019; Ette, 2017; Anifowoshe, 2004).

Party chieftains otherwise known as godfathers have systematically degenerated political parties into tools for satisfying their voracious political appetite at the expense of merit and competence. In western developed countries, the electorate support political parties based on ideology and values. This is unfortunately not the case in Nigeria, where the electorate are financially induced and influenced in a massive case of vote trading (Jones, 2019). The concept of ideologies and values have gradually been replaced by financial gains for all parties involved in this. There is no gain-saying that in 2015, the INEC estimated that a huge number of monies amounting to 196 billion Naira was spent by political parties to participate and contest for electoral positions in the 2015 general elections (Daily Trust, 2019). Most of these funds were claimed to have been allegedly raised by political godfathers with then aim enjoying profitable returns from the stooges elected in public offices. Even godsons who are seen as men of integrity benefit from the benevolence of their godfathers. For example, President Muhammadu Buhari had funds raised for him when he contested the 2015 general elections by a well-known godfather, Asiwaju Bola Tinubu (Premium Times, 2020). Buhari's campaign was alleged to have paid each party delegate the sum of \$3,000 to emerge candidate (Matenga, 2016).

It is however important to note that the pioneer set of godfathers in the country had a progressive ideological mindset. They deemed it unpatriotic to divert the

privileges attributed to godfatherism for their personal aggrandizement. They were particular on the entrenchment of sound political values, grooming the right set of future politicians, as well as positively contributing to the development of their respective regions (Abdulkarim, 2019).

Godfathers according to Omotola (2007), exists in all strata of the Nigerian state, ranging from the religious, academic, and legal institutions. This has in no small way contributed to the criminalization of Nigerian politics. Political godfatherism and governance are two connected yet contradictory concepts that continue to negatively shape the socio-economic lives of teeming Nigerians. Due to this, an unexpected turnaround occurred during the general elections, in Kwara state, North-central Nigeria when the citizens and electorates voted against the godfathers who had held power since the start of the fourth republic in 1999. This signified the end of the 20-year reign of being controlled by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) lost all seats in the state to the All-progressives Congress (APC) in an unexpected turnaround of events in the state. This according to several political analysts in the country had sent very strong waves to other political godfathers that political power had returned to the people.

The theme of godfatherism has been fully operational in Kwara state since 1979 with Dr. Olusola Saraki being one of the earliest financier and godfather in the state. He was instrumental in the victory of Alhaji Adamu Attah in 1979 under the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). However, the relationship took a wrong turn and as a result, Dr. Olusola Saraki had to throw his weight behind Chief Cornelius Adebayo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) despite being a card-

carrying member of the National Party of Nigeria. Unsurprisingly, he, Chief Adebayo won. It became glaring that Dr Olusola Saraki had rose to be the political juggernaut of the state. Upon the restoration to democratic governance in 1999, Dr Olusola Saraki supported once more Mohammed Lawal of the All-Peoples Party (APP). In 2003, Mohammed Lawal was not going to have any of Dr. Olusola Saraki's bullying and decided to break away from the de facto political godfather. The apolitical standoff brought the state to a standstill and was described by many as the primary reason for the loss of Muhammed Lawal in 2003. This ushered in the administration of his son, Dr Bukola Saraki from 2003 to 2011. However, upon completion of Dr Bukola Saraki's two-term tenure in 2011, it had been the silent wish of his father to sustain the chain of political dominance in the state. However, Dr. Bukola Saraki had another plan of his own. This time, it was to upstage his father as the sole political godfather of the state. This led to the defection of Dr Olusola Saraki with his daughter Gbemisola Saraki from the PDP to the Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN). Unsurprisingly, the Abdulfatah Ahmed of the PDP won the election, thereby signalling the end of the political dominance of Dr. Olusola Saraki. This brought into limelight the political acumen of Dr Bukola Saraki. It became dawn that a new political godfather had emerged in the state.

Unfortunately, Dr. Bukola Saraki's political influence came to an end with the loss of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) gubernatorial candidate in the March 9, 2019, election to the candidate of the All-Progressives Congress (APC). Abdulrahman Abdulrazaq of the APC polled at 331, 546 while Abdulrasaq Atunwa scored 114, 75 votes. The APC

also secured all the available 24 seats in the House of Assembly as well as all the three senatorial seats in the state (Oladeinde, 2019).

During this period of political godfatherism, particularly between 1999 to 2019, quite a lot of irregularities had occurred which had impeded upon the developmental and democratisation process of the state. This spans across the health, economic as well as educational sectors. The crux of his paper however seeks to investigate the effect of godfatherism on governance Kwara state. The specific objectives of the research will be to:

- i. examine the effects of political godfatherism on democratic practice in Kwara state.
- ii. examine the effects of political godfatherism on governance in Kwara state.

The research will also be guided by the formulation of hypotheses which include: Hypothesis 1: Political godfatherism has no effect on democracy in Kwara state. Hypothesis 2: Political godfatherism in the society has no effect on governance in Kwara State.

Methodology

A descriptive survey method was employed in analyzing the data generated. Kwara state was chosen among the 36 states in Nigeria due to the revolt against godfatherism which has ushered a new political party in 2019. According to citypopulation.com (2021), the population of Kwara State residents is 3, 192,900. A total number of 385 Kwara State residents were selected for this study, according to Krejcie and Morgan table (1970). The figure is sufficient to the study of the population at 95% confidence level and a 5% error margin.

The sample was randomly picked from the three senatorial districts in Kwara state. A total of 385 copies of questionnaire were distributed to anticipate return.

The sample size (n) is calculated according to the formula: $n = [z^2 * p * (1 - p) / e^2] / [1 + (z^2 * p * (1 - p) / (e^2 * N))]$
Where: $z = 1.96$ for a confidence level (α) of 95%, $p =$ proportion (expressed as a decimal), $N =$ population size, $e =$ margin of error.

$z = 1.96, p = 0.5, N = 7840900, e = 0.05$
 $n = [1.962 * 0.5 * (1 - 0.5) / 0.052] / [1 + (1.962 * 0.5 * (1 - 0.5) / (0.052 * 7840900))]$

$n = 384.16 / 1 = 384.141$

$n \approx 385$

The sample size (with finite population correction) is equal to 385

Furthermore, multi-stage cluster sampling was employed which requires choosing samples in stages due to the technicalities involved in the distribution of population that requires more than one sampling technique. They were different stages of the sampling procedures that were used in this study to collect data. At the initial stage, a list of all 3 senatorial districts was stated and they include Kwara Central, Kwara North with 5 local governments each and Kwara South with 6 local governments.

In the stage two of the selection, Simple Random Sampling technique was used to select five local government areas (Ilorin West, Ilorin South, Offa, Irepodun, Isin). The technique was chosen because it gives all members of the population the equal chance of being included in the sample. Lastly, the convenience sample technique was used in the distribution of the questionnaire to residents of selected areas with the age bracket of 20 and above. The data for this study was gathered using self-administered questionnaire. This questionnaire

specifically contained question items that dealt with the purpose and problem of the study. The questionnaire was constructed in a close ended format. Major constructs in this study were measured with 5-point Likert scale items. The data elicited was analyzed quantitatively looking at the pattern of responses from the key respondents. Similarly, the data collected was based on a descriptive statistical analysis using frequency tables. Inferential tool of regression was used to check the effect of godfatherism on governance. Frequency tables was adopted through SPSS to present the data collected because frequency table shows the total for each category or group of data by depicting the number of times a data value occurs.

Theoretical Framework

The elite theory propounded by Vilfredo Pareto in 1935 was employed for the purpose of this paper. The theory indicates that power resides with individuals who make key decisions in economic, political, military sectors as well as those who determine the mode of production. Due to the privileges that comes with power, the elite theory posits that the elites find it difficult to surrender power and would do everything possible to hold on to it. In the event of a military coup, regime change or end in democratic tenure, power still gets recycled back within the elite caucus. The theory asserts the inequality that exists in the society and that the discussion of rights are only among equals. Hence, this forms the backbone of the psychological and intellectual superiority obtained by the elite. It stresses the belief that the elites are the highest accomplishees in their fields and that they are endowed with personal resources by virtue of inheritance or otherwise such as social and oratory skills, intelligence, and special interest in politics. The theory

thrives on class structures because politics is, essentially, a relationship between haves and the have not and it is defined in terms of power. Therefore, the political elite, refers to a group of highly distinguished persons who are characterized by unique performance in politics, can utilize or monopolize their influence and who possess a sense of group camaraderie to sustain and strengthen their grip on the teeming populace. The political elite always excel in the ability to secure power and rule through whatever means possible. (Woleola, 2017). Scholars have however criticized the theory based on its opposition to pluralism. The theory has been labelled as anti- democratic because it relies on the minority few who determine and dictate on behalf of the majority. This theory in every sense contradicts with the values of democracy, which is hinged upon accountability, transparency, periodic election amongst others.

Literature Review

The conceptual overview of 'Godfatherism' is one issue that continues to evolve in the Nigerian Political system. 'Godfatherism' is not just prevalent in Nigeria alone but a global phenomenon, However, this has risen to prominence especially in the case of Nigeria where so many factors are contributing to these unpatriotic activities (Muhammed, 2022). Unsurprisingly, majority of emerging literatures on political godfatherism focus on developing countries, particularly Africa. This is because patrimonialism, clientelism, rent seeking kleptocracies and electoral malpractices accompanied most democratic dispensations in Africa (Mamogale, 2013). As a result, political godfatherism can be seen as a patron-client relationship in which the states resources are depicted as goods and

services. Usually, these varieties of goods and services are not traded within the confines of the law and regulations. This simply means that the way in which these goods and services are traded between the principal and the agent does not follow any legal prescripts (Mamogale, 2013). In order words, political godfatherism is not stipulated by law, thus often leading non-compliance with recruitment or human resource management laws and regulations (Mustapha, 2019).

Political party can be seen as the platform through which individuals contest for electoral offices in any functional democracy. However, to a large extent, majority of the political parties, particularly in Africa have been subjected to compromise by the godfathers. The formation of Party system in Nigeria has become a wholly private investment. While it is logically correct that candidates must depend upon political parties for canvassing for votes from the electorate, emerging as flag bearers is solely dependent in most cases on lobbying and coming into ludicrous agreement with party stalwarts and godfathers. This negates the doctrine of merit and competence. The introduction of political money bags has reshaped the dynamics of political processes in the Nigerian political space (Philip, Chris, Osimeral & Kingsley, 2014).

Alabi & Tunde, 2013, cited in Abdulkarim (2019) rightly observed that the political godfather phenomenon is not new in Nigeria context. This situation commenced during the First Republic when the leading nationalists of the country (Nnamdi Azikwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa etc.) controlled political activities in Nigeria. However, there have been lots of changes and dynamics between the philosophical positions of godfatherism in the First Republic and the current form of

godfatherism in the fourth republic (Mustapha, 2019).

The seed of godfatherism in Nigerian politics is deep-rooted, and very much obvious in all parties in Nigeria. Where political support is mobilized based on values and ideologies in western climes, the reverse is the case in Nigeria. Political support is mobilized based on the direction and influence of godfathers. There is a recurring pattern of ex-governors' desires to remain influential as policymakers and economic drivers in their state. These desires tend to impose on the extant governor who may have gotten his seat on the back of his predecessor. In most cases, this imposition often degenerates into clashes of interest between these godfathers and their incumbent (Jonathan, 2022). The fracas in Osun state between Mr. Rauf Aregbesola, the past governor (2010-2018) and current minister of interior (2019-2023) and Governor Gboyega Oyetola readily comes to mind. Aregbesola assumed the godfather role in Osun state politics, one capable of deciding the fate of the next governor of the state and was responsible for the success of his successor. However, there was heightened tension between these two individuals regarding matters of state politics which resulted in a major intra-party conflict in the APC. Aregbesola prophesied that Oyetola would not return as governor for a second term, which eventually came to pass in an electoral showdown on 16 July, 2022.

Before the election, the minister had favored and selected Alhaji Moshood Adeoti for the position, but Oyetola wanted a second shot at the governorship position. Alhaji Moshood Adeoti was floored in the 2022 Osun state APC primaries as Oyetola scored 222,169 votes while Adeoti had only 12,921 votes (The Punch, 2022). This fallout has been

described by political spectators as one the major reasons why governor Oyetola lost the election to Ademola Adeleke of the PDP. In Kano state, similar pattern of betrayal has been recorded. Governor Abdullahi Ganduje was Rabiu Kwankwaso's deputy. He thus became the governor's godson with many other contestants reportedly frustrated out of the race to pave the way for him to take over from Kwankwaso in 2015.

Godfatherism is hinged on influence, and this was evident in the tussle between Ogun state Governor, Dapo Abiodun, and his predecessor, Ibikunle Amosun. While it has been the ambition of the latter to hold a firm grip on the political terrain of the state under ruling APC in the state, the former would not bulge to such intimidating plans. He was equally adamant on consolidating his hold on power in the state as well as breaking from the shackles of his predecessor. This led to internal wangling within the Ogun state APC chapter. With Amosun having established a formidable party structure in the state, he therefore decided to play the godfather role in preferring Adekunle Akinlade as his successor, not Dapo Abiodun. However, with a more superior support from another godfather Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Abiodun emerged as the choice of the party, thereby breaking the strongholds of Amosun in Ogun state (Jonathan, 2022).

The factor of godfatherism is equally observed in the 2019 case between Adams Oshiomhole and Governor Godwin Obaseki in Edo state politics. The incumbent governor of Edo state, Godwin Obaseki had been favored by his predecessor. The former governor, Oshiomhole, had described Obaseki as the "brain and creativity" behind his own administration. However, after several disputations which erupted between the duo, their political relationship got to a

breaking point and enmity exuded. The favored son began to dictate terms of visit and association to his erstwhile “father” to limit the influence of Oshiomole on decision-making affairs in the state.

In Lagos, ex-governor Akinwunmi Ambode also lost the goodwill of the political godfather of the state, Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Since 1999, Bola Ahmed Tinubu has been accused of being domineering and self-indulgent with the intent to siphon all the resources of Lagos state to himself. He successfully fought with the federal government against the creation of more local governments in Lagos state. This indeed shows how powerful he is. It is believed that the disloyal attitude from Ambode was the actual cause of the fallout between the duo. Since the 1999 handing over to democratic rule, Akinwunmi Ambode is the only governor of Lagos state that served for only a single tenure, Tinubu had favored a more “visionary and committed” Babajide Sanwo-Olu. It is pertinent to remain graced by Bola Ahmed Tinubu for a healthy and prosperous political career in Lagos state. Borno State however presents a completely opposite narrative. This is because there seems to be a sense of utmost mutual respect and robust relationship between the godfather of Borno politics; Senator Kashim Shettima and his political godson, Professor Babangana Zulum. In a recent interview, Senator Shettima spoke on his relationship with governor Zulum.

“Our relationship is directly related to our commitment to the service of our people and country. I had the privilege to serve as governor for eight years, and we had a determination that our successor must be a better and more qualified individual. Our state was very lucky to find such a person in Professor Zulum. Allah made the recruitment of a

successor. Borno state got it right with him”. I think that is the “magic,” (Economic Confidential 2022, Pp 3,).

On why other so-called godfathers in other states don’t seem to find peace with their so-called godsons, he said:

“The battle of wits between an overbearing, exiting leader and his successor commences right during the transition period, becomes a cold war during the first year, and explodes into full-scale political warfare in the second year. If I were to apportion blame, 75 percent of the blame should go to the predecessor and 25 percent to the successor. Charlatans will always try to create discord because, without one, their source of livelihood dries up. When Governor Zulum called the bluff of some political jobbers, guess the modus operandi they resorted to? Lavishing praises on me to curry favors from him.”. (Economic Confidential 2022, Pp 4,)

On how he diligently conducted a robust search for a successor, luckily struck gold by finding Professor Zulum and expertly groomed him for the task ahead, Shettima continued:

“From May 29, 2015, when I was sworn-in into office for the second term as the governor of Borno state, I initiated my search for a successor, and by September 2016, I started narrowing down my list, purely based on performance. By December 2017, I had a potential successor in mind. I was only waiting for how to actualize it. The day Professor Zulum became the candidate of the APC in October 2018, I no longer thought of myself as governor of Borno. I began to involve him in most decisions I was taking, and I increased his involvement when he became governor elect. Many times, if I asked him to take decisions, he would insist I was still the governor and I would also insist he was to be affected by any decision, so he needed to be part of

it” (Economic Confidential 2022 Pp 4).

Findings and Analysis

This section presents the analysis and interpretation of data that was derived for the research work. A total of 385 questionnaires were administered and 370 were returned.

Analysis of Overall Response Rate of Share Questionnaire

Table 1
Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Individual	Frequency	Percentage
Sex of Respondents		
Male	233	63
Female	137	37
Total	370	100.0
Age of Respondents		
20-29 years	20	5.4
30-39 years	107	28.9
40-49 years	118	31.9
Above 50 years	125	33.8
Total	370	100.0
Marital Status		
Single	115	31.1
Married	182	49.2
Divorced	73	19.7
Total	370	100.0

Source: Author’s Computation (2023)

The result showed that 233 (63%) of the respondents were male while 137 (37%) were female. This implies that they were more males than females. This is an indication that both genders were involved in the respondents.

Furthermore, the ages of the respondents also shows that 125 (33.8%) were above 50 years, followed by 118 (31.9%) who were between 40-49 years, followed by 107 (28.9%) who were between 30-39years, lastly 20 (5.4%) were between 20-29 above. This indicate that majority

of the respondents were above 50 years and are perhaps one of the most affected by the scourge of financial clientelism in the state.

Data Presentation and Analysis of Research questionnaire

Table 2
Community Development and Local Government Efficacy

S/N	Community Development	Mean	Std. Dev.
1	Political godfatherism exists in the society	3.19	1.518
2	Access to wealth contributes to godfatherism	3.59	1.418
3	Godfatherism has a positive influence in local politics	3.62	1.404
4	Incumbency factor is a major determinant of godfatherism	3.99	1.129
5	Has the government been poor in service delivery	2.29	1..129
6	Do you think corruption exists in the current government administration?	3.04	1.414
7	Do you think that high level of favoritism has over shadowed governance?	2.95	1.363
8	Do you think that citizens are able to air their views on current happenings?	3.38	1.440
9	In your experience, do you think that democracy supports free and fair election?	3.39	1.339

Source: Author’s Computation (2023)

Question 1 shows the view of respondents on if political godfatherism exists in the society The mean ratio poled at 3.19. However, this implies majority of the respondents strongly agreed with this. Question 2 shows the view of respondents on if access to wealth contributes to godfatherism. The mean ratio poled at 3.59. This implies majority of the respondents strongly agreed with this.

Question 3 shows the view of

respondents on if Godfatherism has a positive influence in local politics. To this effect the mean ratio derived was 3.62. This implies that majority of the respondents strongly agreed.

Question 4 shows the view of respondents on if they thought Incumbency factor is a major determinant of godfatherism. The mean ratio was 3.99. However, this implies majority of the respondents agreed to the question.

Question 5 shows the view of respondents on if the government has been poor in service delivery. Regarding this, the mean ratio derived was 2.29.

This implies that majority of the respondents strongly disagreed with this

Question 6 shows the view of respondents on if they thought that think corruption exists in the current government administration. The mean ratio was 3.04. However, this implies majority of the respondents agreed to the question.

Question 7 shows the view of respondents on if they thought that high level of favoritism has over shadowed governance. Regarding this, the mean ratio derived was 2.95. This implies that majority of the respondents strongly disagreed with this

Question 8 shows the view of respondents regarding if citizens are able to air their views on current happenings? The mean ratio poled at 3.38. However, this implies majority of the respondents strongly agreed with this.

Question 9 shows the view of respondents on if democracy supports free and fair election. The mean ratio was 3.39. However, this implies majority of the respondents agreed to the question. This response is however surprising. This is so because the state is a Muslim dominated region, where one would have assumed that the concept of democracy would not be favoured compared to

Islamic mode of governance (Shariah). This response however further attests to the popularity of democracy even in the core Muslims dominated regions of the countr

Hypothesis One

Political godfatherism in the society has no effect on governance in Kwara State.

Table 3 Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
1	.383 ^a	.146	.144

a. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism exists in the s

Source: The Author, 2022

Table 3 reveals the extent to which the dependent variable (governance) is explained by the independent variable (political godfatherism). R-squared measures the goodness of fit of the model, indicating the fraction of variance in the dependent variable that may be forecast from the independent variable. The R-squared value is 0.146 expressed as a percentage (14.6%), which shows that 14.6 variation in governance is explained by political godfatherism existing in Kwara. The R value of 0.383 indicates that there is a positive relationship between political godfatherism which exist in society and governance.

Table 4 ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	Df
1	Regression	107.931	1
	Residual	629.377	36
	Total	737.308	36

a. Dependent Variable: Governance
b. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism exists in the s

Source: The Author, 2022

Table 4 shows the overall assessment of the statistical significance level of 0.000, which indicates that the model in this table is statistically significant (p < 0.05). Thus, political godfatherism influences governance i

Table 5 Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized B
1	(Constant)	1.905
	Political godfatherism	.356

a. Dependent Variable: Governance

Source: The Author, 2022

Table 5 presents the extent to which political godfatherism affects governance on teenage students. The beta coefficient is 0.356 with an associated significance level of 0.000. The significance level shows that there is a significant contribution in explaining governance. Hence, political godfatherism has a significant effect on governance in Kwara state.

Decision Rule

Since the significance level of the model is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis should be rejected, while the alternate hypothesis is accepted. It can therefore be concluded that political godfatherism has a significant effect on governance in Kwara state.

Hypothesis 2

Political godfatherism has no effect on democracy in Kwara state

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
1	.096 ^a	.009	.007

a. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism in society

Source: The Author, 2022

Table 6 reveals the extent to which the dependent variable (democracy) variance is explained by the independent variable (political godfatherism). R-squared measures the goodness of fit of the model, indicating the fraction of variance in the dependent variable that may be forecast from the independent variable. The R-squared value is 0.009 expressed as a percentage (9%), which shows that 9 variations in democracy is explained by political godfatherism. The R value of 0.096 indicates that there is a weak positive relationship between

political godfatherism and democracy.

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square
1	Regression	3.764	1	3.764
	Residual	403.004	368	1.095
	Total	406.768	369	

a. Dependent Variable: Democracy

b. Predictors: (Constant), Political godfatherism

Source: The Author, 2022

Table 7 shows the overall assessment of the statistical significance of the model result. The F-statistic of the model is 3.437 with a significance level of 0.065, which indicates that the model in this table is not statistically significant (sig = 0.065). Based on this result, we accept the null hypothesis (p > 0.05). Thus, political godfatherism has no effect on democracy in Kwara state, which means that the alternate hypothesis is rejected.

Table 8 Coefficient Table

model	Unstandardized	coefficient	standardized	T	Significance
		Std. Error	Coefficients Beta		
1 (Constant)	3.668	.127		28.904	.000
Political godfatherism exists in the society	.067	.036	.096	1.854	.065

Dependent Variable: Democracy

Source: The Author, 2022

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