



Politics and Power in Inter-Group Conflict: Evidence from Jos, Nigeria

By

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Abstract: *The paper examines the role of politics and power contestation in inter-group relations with Jos as a case analysis. Group conflict theory is adopted as a framework for analyzing conflict in the region. The study found that, as opposed to the assertions that religion and indigene/settler phenomenon are the main drivers of conflict in the region, struggle for political power is a stronger causative factor of conflict in the area. Besides, the study also found that religion and ethnic differences achieve sufficient strength to provoke or aggravate conflicts when politics and power struggle are involved. The study therefore, recommends, among others, the need to revisit the status of Jos North Local Government Area, implement the recommendations of various panels and the practice of politics of inclusiveness by political leaders.*

Keywords: *Politics, Power, Conflict, Intergroup Relations, Jos, Nigeria.*

Introduction

Politics has element of conflict. This is because competition for political power among individuals and groups aimed at controlling and distributing scarce resources, most often, is violence-ridden (Easton 1965; Ball 1977; Harris 1979; Joshua, 2013). The incidence of politics and conflict in Nigeria is worrisome. Little wonder that Obasanjo (2002;50-51) asserts that, “we fight and sometimes shed blood to achieve and retain

political power because for us in Nigeria, the political kingdom has for too long been the gateway to economic kingdom”. It is necessary to understand the fact that although conflict in Nigeria and in other places may be attributed to lots of factors such as religious and identity differences, indigene/ settler conflict, among others, the fact still remains that politics, is a major source of conflict. As stated by Dunning (2011 cited in

Joshua, 2013), the only source of war is politics because war is simply a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means. Before there can be war, it is a matter of necessity that there is conflict because conflict prepares the ground for war. Tarimos (2010) also argues that ethnic groups engage one another in contest for political power with each advocating its interest in different ways. He concluded that people do not kill one another on the pretext of ethnic (or group) differences; they kill each other when these differences promote unhealthy competition. The situation becomes explosive when the climate of social relationship is extended to the political and economic spheres.

Nigeria is today suffused with communal, ethnic, ethno-religious and political conflicts that often manifest in ferocious and very destructive violence (Ikelegbe, 2003; Joshua, 2013). The situation has assumed a dangerous dimension since the beginning of Nigeria's Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999. Imobighe (2003) avers that, within the first three years of democratic rule in Nigeria, the country had witnessed not less than forty violent communal or ethnic conflicts, while some old ones had gained additional potency. Instances of such inter-group conflict included the Zango-Kataf in Kaduna State; Tiv-Jukun

in Wukari, Taraba State; Ogoni-Andoni in Rivers State; Chamber-Ketub in Taraba State; Itsekiri-Ijaw/Urhobo in Delta state; Ife-Modakeke in Ogun State; Bassa-Egbura in Nasarawa State to mention just a few.

The Federal Government has increased security in some of these communities, but government authorities have failed to break the cycle of killings by not prosecuting those responsible for these crimes. In all, only few cases of perpetrators have been brought to book. Over the years various committees and commissions have been set up by the Federal Government to examine the issues generating conflicts, but their reports and occasional government white paper, have mostly been shelved (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

The paper focuses on inter-group conflicts in Jos, the capital of Plateau State in Nigeria, which of recent, has become a theatre of violent conflicts. The incidence of violent conflicts in Jos has become a repetitive phenomenon, especially during the current Fourth Republic. It is against this background that this paper examines conflicts in the area from the perspective of politics and competition for political power. This paper is guided by these questions: is politics and competition for political power the fundamental bane of violent conflict in Jos? Are differences in religious inclination a contributory factor to conflict in Jos?

Are there indigene/settler dimensions to the conflicts? Following this introduction, the paper is organized into the following subsections; section one conceptualizes conflict and discussed the theoretical framework of the study. The next section focuses on the geographic and demographic profile of Jos. section three is on the historical excursion of the origin of violent conflict in the area and the perspectives of the major groups as regards the causes of conflicts in Jos. The last section, which is section four, constitutes conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptual Discourse On Politics

According to Appadorai (1974:3), the term politics is derived from the Greek word '*polis*', a city-state. This definition sees politics from the angle of political organization and the relationship between individuals and the state. Onyeke (2003), is of the view that politics is directed towards and anchored on the achievement of power. It is not a surprise therefore that politics is seen as striving to share power, or influence it's distribution either among states or among groups within a state (Bentham, 1974). In fact, Nnoli (1978:81) illustrates the intimate relationship between politics and power. He argues that the adequate understanding of power is crucial for the comprehension of politics:

Power exists in practically almost all institutions. It follows the same dynamics. But when we talk about power in politics, we talk about state power. Politics is an attempt to be in the highest position possible so as to wield state power. All other forms of power yield to it and are, or can be controlled by it. This explains its attractiveness. Those who are wealthy and thus expected to be contented must still strive for control of state power, because without this control, their wealth may not be secured as state power could be used to take their wealth away.

It can be deduced from the above definitions that state power guarantees access to almost everything in life. The volatility usually generated by political activities in comparison with economic, social and cultural activities is an eloquent testimony of the fact that, the usefulness of state power to groups and individuals is widely recognized. Thus, people scheme, jostle and sometimes kill in a manner that is not seen in the other spheres of life in other to gain political power (Nnoli, 1986).

Having examined some of the definitions of politics and the linkage between politics and

power, it is germane to come out with a working definition of politics in the light of the discussion. Politics in the context of this paper is seen in a pejorative sense which denote the use of blackmails, double-dealing, manipulation, violence, assassination fanning the embers of sentiment and other forms of immoral means to acquire, retain, and use political power for selfish purposes.

On Conflict

Opinions are divided as regard the meaning of conflict. Audu (2010) argues that conflict is a very fluid and ambiguous term, usually with negative connotation. Ross (1993:14) notes that conflict “occurs when parties disagree about the distribution of material or symbolic resources and act because of the incompatibility of goals or a perceived divergence of interest”. Horowitz (1985:101) sees conflict as a “struggle in which the aim is to get objective and simultaneously neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals”. Daugherty and Falztraff (cited in Omotosho, 2004), view conflict as a situation in which one identifiable group of human beings which could be tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious, socio-economic, political or otherwise is in a state of conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups. This could be because those groups are pursuing what appears to be incompatible goals.

The various definitions above portray conflict in a negative term, however, it must be mentioned that politics may not necessarily be evil. As scholars like Nwolise (2004) and Pruitt (2004) argue, conflict may even bring about development. It is when conflict is not well-managed and allowed to snowball to violent conflagration that it becomes evil.

In situating this work within a theoretical construct, the study adopts group conflict theory.

Theoretical Framework

Group Conflict Theory

Theorists that subscribe to this theoretical construct view conflict as a product of a struggle for power among various groups within a society. Scholars like Esses and Jackson (2008) argue that group conflict theory apart from dealing with the origins and functions of inter-group conflict, it tends to place particular emphasis on the role of either socially prevalent ideologies or situational factors which work together to create and exacerbate perceptions of inter-group competition and tension. The assumption of this model is that, political violence for instance is as a result of conflict between different actors within a given political enclave. In that circumstance, all politics is inherent in conflict between political actors representing their various groups. Hewstone *et al* (2008) contend that groups in proximity are often groups in conflict. Neighbouring groups often pose potential threats to social

identity, to numerical superiority, to locally held power, even to the existence of one's own group. Even in conflicts that appear to be ethnic (such as Hutus-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi) competition for power and resources may be as important as ethnic differences.

Similarly, there is a strand of group theory which emphasizes sub-cultural division. The main argument of this strand is that political instability is a function of cultural pluralism of heterogeneous nations in which the focal point of political identification and socialization is based on sub-national communities with different cultures and history (Powel 1992). This position has been corroborated by Morrison and Stephenson (1972) that cultural pluralism increases the possibility of conflict between members of communal groups. This is similar to power approach position that "racial and ethnic groups compete for power, prestige and privilege and that, hostilities will arise and increase with intensity of competition" (Giles and Evans, 1986:471 cited in Joshua, 2013).

The position above lends credence to the assertion that elite, in the course of contending for power, often manipulate social divisions and blow them out of proportion with threat, fear, hate, discord, propaganda, thereby, making politics to be crisis laden. Thus, elite create opportunities with issues and crises to advance their interests and goals. Conciliation is difficult when rival

leaders demonize their adversaries as opponents who can never be trusted and must therefore be defeated, dominated or ethnically cleansed (Obserschall, 2010). Political elite seems to occupy the center stage of political activities and power contestation with implication for inter-group conflict because according to Isumonah (1997), the initiative for ethnic mobilization originates from the elite; ethnic nationalist movements are led by the elite; and ethnic mobilization is primarily, if not totally, for the benefits of the elites.

The next segment probes the background of conflicts in Jos.

Background to Jos Conflict

Plateau state is located in the Middle Belt of Nigeria. It is important to state that the idea of Middle Belt came about as a result of the nature of politics in Nigeria's First Republic (1960-1966) (some minor ethnic groups complained of marginalization by the major ethnic group, hence the creation of the Middle Belt in the North to assuage the fear of minorities in the North) (Best, 2008). Jos is the capital of plateau state and is located in the north east zone of the country. It is situated at 9:56 N 8.53 E, high on the Jos Plateau. It has a population of 510, 000, making it the 10th largest city in Nigeria (Onuoha, et al, 2010).

The violent conflicts in Jos are between the indigenes –Berom, Anaguta and Afizere ethnic groups and the Hausa/Fulani that are classified as settlers. Most authors

often viewed violent conflicts in Jos from indigenes/settlers and religious perspectives (Omotola, 2006 cited in Para-Malam, 2011; Best, 2008, Kwaja, 2008, Adi, 2011). However, this paper examined intergroup conflicts in Jos from political perspective. Before incessant violent conflicts in Jos, the entire Plateau State lived to its name- Home of Peace and Tourism but of recent has become a theatre of conflict (Onuoha, et al 2010). Violent conflicts in Jos seems to have started in the 1990's specifically from 1994 and has continued till date.

In addition, the city has witnessed a lot of suicide bombing which is believed to have been orchestrated by the Boko Haram group (ICG, 2012). It has been observed that since 2001, violence in Jos has become more frequent and deadlier. Between 1999 and 2001, over 80 episodes of violent conflicts between the indigenes (Boom, Anaguta and Afizere) and the Hausa/Fulani settlers were recorded. However, there seems to be an increase and intensity in violent conflicts in the area since 2004 although no exact figures are available. Not less than 4,000 people have died in violent conflicts in the area in the past eleven years (ICG, 2012). Non – indigenous communities alone claimed they have lost as detailed below; south-west (Yoruba), number killed 630, estimate of material losses N450 billion; south-east (Igbo) number killed 604, estimate of material losses N410 billion and

south –south claimed that no fewer than 430 of their indigenes have been killed with N110 billion material losses. A total of 1, 664 people from the aforementioned non-indigenes have been killed, while property worth a total of 970 billion have been destroyed since 1994 (Suleiman, 2011). The figures above did not include the indigenes and Hausa/Fulani group that have died in the crises.

Some of the remote causes of violent conflicts in Jos as listed by Suleiman (2011) hinges on the claim of the ownership of Jos; indigeneship of Jos; effort at Islamization of the area; delimitation of electoral wards; blockage of roads during worship; indiscriminate use of speakers; Fulani trespassing on farmlands; alleged discrimination against Muslims by government; and non-implementation of previous reports. The different perspectives to conflicts in Jos are depicted in the next section.

Conflict Perspectives and Causes of Conflict in Jos

It is important to understand that perception is a major source of conflicts which is why in analyzing conflict, it is necessary to present the different perspectives of parties in conflict so as to proffer valid solutions. This is because this understanding will provide information on how parties view conflict. According to Best (2007), the various perspectives of violent conflict in Jos include:

The Hausa/Fulani Perspectives

The Fulani did not lay claim to the ownership of Jos and are never interested in the political issues that generated conflict in Jos. They claimed that attacks on them by the so-called indigenes are borne out of envy as a result of cows they own and because they are Muslims like the Hausa that is why they are often treated like the Hausas by the indigenes. However, the Hausa version has it that the land belong to the Hausa/Fulani because they believe that they founded Jos when it was a virgin land and developed it into a modern town. They also believe they outnumbered any other groups in the city up to 1950; that they ruled the town traditionally, and produced eleven Hausa/Fulani rulers up till 1947 after which they were maneuvered out of the stool. They also buttressed their claims by the presence of Alkali courts which was to service the needs of the Hausa/Fulani population in Jos till 1950's. In addition, the naming of major streets and areas in Jos with Hausa name such as (Abba Na Shehu, Garba Daho, Sarkin Arab, Gangare, etc) and their political contributions, having been elected and appointed to represent Jos at different positions of responsibility, dating back to the colonial times, among others, authenticate the fact that the land belongs to the Hausa/Fulani group.

Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere Perspectives

The three groups mentioned above claimed that Jos belong to them and that the name Jos is derived from their native languages. For example the Berom claimed that Jos is derived from Berom traditional name 'Jot' meaning water spring which was corrupted by strangers like Europeans and Hausa/ Fulani and changed to Jos. The Afizere and Anaguta also have their own version of the derivative of Jos from their own native names. However the tree ethnic groups classified as indigenes argued that the Hausa/ Fulani group were brought into Jos by the colonial overlords as a result of the high demand for tin in the tin industry in Jos especially during the Second World War and that they have been living in the area for quite a long time.

They debunked the claim by the Hausas to have ruled Jos, and maintained that such acclaimed rulers were only appointed as leaders over the Hausa settlements in the tin mines and had nothing to do with other indigenes. They also added that, since Hausa/Fulani did not succeed in conquering the Jos area in any pre- colonial battle, or after then during the popular Jihad war, their argument of having rule Jos in the past is baseless. The indigenes also claimed that they have their own names for different locations in Jos. They argued that by 1960 the Hausa allegedly renamed most parts of the city in Hausa names, which they now

use as evidence that they founded the city. The indigenes version as regard ownership of Jos went further that during the creation of Jos North Local Government in 1991, they (the indigenes) were initially passive as they did not understand the impact of the local government creation but they had hoped it was for development.

Having examined the various versions of indigenes/settlers claims on the ownership of Jos, it is necessary to state that the continuous settlers/ indigenes conflict in Jos is a reflections of the long standing sense of grievance between a small Muslim community who felt that they were treated as second class citizens by the indigenes. The Hausa/Fulani grievance seems to be predicated on lack of access to power and resources despite their claim of being the majority in the biggest of the local government area, Jos North (ICG, 2012). The next segment explored the political dimension of intergroup conflicts in Jos.

Politics and Power in Inter-Group Conflicts in Jos

The late former governor of Plateau State Solomon Lar postulated that the problem in Jos is not religion but politics (Suleiman, 2011). The problem of Jos is traceable to the balkanization of the former Jos local government in 1991 into Jos North and Jos South Local Government Councils by the General Ibrahim Babangida military junta (Suleiman, 2011). This exercise (balkanization of Jos Local Government Area into

two) appears a watershed in the politics and governance of the city of Jos. The I C G (2012) notes that the balkanization of the former Jos Local Government Area into Jos North and South were done at the insistence of the Hausa and Fulani community in Jos (the head of the government in power then being from Hausa extraction yielded to this demand by dividing the existing Jos Local Government Area into Jos North and South). It should be noted that the Hausa/Fulani are concentrated in Jos North thus the creation of Jos North Local Government Area altered the political equation of the ancient city-Jos in favour of the Hausa/Fulani. The implication of the above can be seen in two ways: it changed the dominant position of the indigenes in the Jos North as they were no longer the most populous in the Jos North and they also lost control over the Palace of their paramount leader, the Gbong Gwom, which was in the heart of Jos city. Added to this is the fact that, it gave the settlers (Hausa/Fulani) opportunity for group expressions which they had always canvassed for.

In short, the creation of Jos North Local Government Area resulted in frosty or strain relations between the indigenes and settlers. This situation was exacerbated with the election of Samaila Mohammed, a Hausa/Fulani settler as the first elected Chairman of the Jos North Local Government Council. Although he issued certificate of indigeneship to both

Hausa/Fulani and the host community, he however, appointed members of his community (Hausa/Fulani) into sensitive positions in the council, a development frowned at by the indigenes (ICG, 2012).

Some years later, the strained relationship between Hausa/ Fulani settlers and the indigenes (Berom/Anaguta/Afizere) degenerated into violent conflagration when Alhaji Aminu Mato another Hausa- Fulani was appointed the Chairman of Jos North Local Government Area by the then state Military Governor, Col. Mohammed Mana (Onuoha et al, 2010). The appointment of Aminu Mato by Col. Mohammed as the Chairman of Jos North Local Government Council was interpreted by the indigenes as an imposition of a settler on them by the government of the day especially with the fact that Col. Mohammed Mana is of the same ethnic group with Aminu Mato. In fact, between 1991 and May 29, 1999 when the military quit the political arena and handed over political power to civilian government, the Military Governors/Administrators in the state (Plateau State) are all Hausas ditto the Caretaker Chairmen of Jos North (ICG, 2012). The return of democratic rule in Nigeria however, changed this power structure. When election was conducted into the governorship position of Plateau State in 1999, Joshua Dariye an indigene of the state emerged as a

winner. He also recontested in the 2003 election and won again. The state was firmly under the control of an indigene. It obviously resulted in the concentration of power and resources in his hand which he could use to shape state policy and influence who holds local office. He was sacked during the introduction of emergency rule in Plateau State and was subsequently impeached by the State House of Assembly (all between 2004 to November 2006), but was later reinstated by the verdict of the Supreme Court in April 2007 (Human Right Watch, 2011).

Dariye, during his tenure, promised to include the Hausa/Fulani in the political affairs of the state but was accused to have denied the Hausa/Fulani citizenship rights and claims and also attempted to indigenize all major positions. However, he allowed settler representatives to be members of Jos North Council Caretaker Committee as he refused to conduct local government elections and rather preferred to appoint sole administrators to run the councils. Added to the above is the claim by the Hausa-Fulani in Jos that since 1999, only two of them have enjoyed been voted into the Plateau House of Assembly and the National Assembly. The Hausa/Fulani heaped the blame on the Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC) accusing it of manipulation, and the incumbent using his power to rig elections. This perceived scenario of the

Hausa/Fulani aggravated the sense of alienation which they often vent in form of religious crises (I C G, 2012). In the opinion of Onuoha et al (2010), religious undertone of the conflict could be partly attributed to the adoption of Sharia (Islamic legal code) by most states in the North. Thus, Hausa/Fulani that seems to constitute the majority in Jos North advocated for it in the area, hence, the violence that attended this demand.

After the expiration of Dariye's tenures, Jonah Jang the incumbent was elected in 2007 and 2011. He belongs to a very small sub- ethnic group, within the bigger Berom community. Jang's tenures have been very tempestuous as the spate of violence since he started as the governor of Plateau State has increased. On 28 November 2008, there was violence in Jos. This was linked to local government politics (Onuoha et al, 2010). The violence was a fallout of the local government election in Jos North. What triggered the conflict was the allegation by the Hausa/Fulani that the Jang administration has planned to rig election so as to pave way for electoral victory of his cousin a Berom, who contested on the platform of the People Democratic Party (PDP) (Suleiman, 2011). Violence also broke out over the results of an election on the ground that the election was won by the candidate of the PDP who is a Christian. The riot left in its wake over 1000 dead and property

(houses, mosques, churches and cars) worth millions of naira damaged.

On Sunday 17, January 2010 a bloody violence broke out in Jos again, more than 400 people were killed in this round of violence. It was believed to be as a result of dispute between Christians and Muslims in Nasarawa Gwom area of the city. It seems to be a reprisal attack for the deficiencies some parties suffered during 2008 bloodbath. On 7th march, 2010, another violent conflict rocked the city. The attack was carried out by hundreds of Fulani herdsmen who invaded three Christian villages of DogoNahawa, Ratsat ad Zot at midnight. About 500 persons mostly women, children and elderly people were victims. The violence was interpreted as a reprisal attack led by Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups over the killings of mostly Muslims in January 2010 riot (Onuoha et al, 2010).

The crisis in Jos grew worse under Jang because he seems to give sections of the public impression that he has personal and ethnic agenda. He was quoted to have said that the indigenes should stop selling land to settlers and also relocated the palace of Gbong Gwom from Jos North to Jos South, where the indigenes have numerical advantage. Appointment into major political offices and location of infrastructures facilities appears to be tilted towards this communal logic (i.e favouring the indigenes) (ICG, 2012).

The crisis in Jos has been compounded by the involvement of suicide bombers. The city witnessed three suicide bombings between December 2011 and March 2012 suspected to have been orchestrated by members of Boko Haram. There were further attacks in April and June 2012 (ICG, 2012). The attack either by Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram of recent on Jos has been intermittent.

From the above analysis, it can be deduced that politics and competition for political power is the major source of conflicts in Jos, although there are ethnic and religious undertone to conflicts in the area. The indigene/settler phenomenon and religions differences are not major issues in Jos if there are no political dimensions to them. The reason violent conflicts in Jos seem to be ethnic or identity based is because ethnic identity serves as the leeway to economic and political resources from which non-indigenes are excluded. In addition, as stated before, because the Hausa-Fulani groups are mostly Muslims and the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere (indigenes) are predominantly Christians, it often made political violence to be expressed in religious terms.

Our finding is in line with the current trend of thought as reflected by Kaigama (2012:19) in his analysis on a decade of interventions in the Plateau State crises that:

...May I state that all the past crises in the state had

underlying political motivations. They only appear on the surface to be ethnic or religious but they had serious political undertones. Very often, they started off as political struggles and later assumed other dimensions. Peace in Plateau state largely depends on the sincerity of politicians to work with the well-being of our people.

In the same vein, Sha (2005) and Para-Malam, (2011) posit that conflict among groups in Jos is traceable to political appointment. The Sultan of Sokoto, in his Ramadan speech in August 2011 commented on the crisis that:

Politicians in and out of power must resist the temptation of using religion as a means of gaining acceptability.... If you are playing politics you should not involve religion. Avoid the temptation. That easily leads to problems and violence most of the time... (Paden, 2012).

The above position validate the fact that politics and competition for political power is central to Jos crises. The section below examined the various efforts at managing inter-group conflicts in Jos.

Characteristically in its manner, the Federal Government has deployed Special Task Force (STF) a joint police-military operation to Jos after the 2001 crisis. The Task Force was accused of taken side. They were accused of supporting the Hausa-

Fulani groups, particularly the Fulani herdsmen in attacking villages dominated by the indigenes. This is because Fulani herdsmen attacks were said to have taken place very close to where the Task Force were stationed without any arrest being made. They were equally alleged to have exchanged their guns for money and other luxury things.

In addition, the government set up several commissions of inquiries to probe the crisis. Some of the commissions of inquiries include the Justice Aribiton Fiberesima Panel, which probed the crisis of 1994, the Justice Niki Tobi's Panel, which investigated the crisis of 2001. There was also the Peace Conference of 2006; called Plateau Resolve, the Emmanuel Abisoye Panel, the Bola Ajibola Commission of inquiry and an 18 member Presidential Advisory Committee headed by the late Solomon Lar a statesman and former civilian governor of the state.

Notable of these commissions that made far reaching recommendations towards resolving the violent conflicts in Jos are the Niki Tobi, Bola Ajibola and the Solomon Lar Commissions. There recommendations covered land ownership, security, politics and reconciliation, religious, Jos local government status, treatment of suspects and compensation to victims of violent conflict in Jos.

All the reports of the various panels ascribed ownership of Jos to the native tribes of Afrizere, Anaguta

and Berom but the Hausa Communities challenged it in court. All the commissions of inquiry also recommended the restructuring of the Jos North local government to correct perceived imbalance, among others for detail see (Sha, 2005; Onuoha et al, 2010; Suleiman, 2011; ICG, 2012; The News, 2012).

Conclusion and Recommendations

From the foregoing discourse, it can be concluded that politics is a major issue generating conflict in the city of Jos, although its manifestations seem to take on religious and indigene/settler colouration. However, in order to mitigate the issues resulting in, reduce, and if possible, eliminate the conflicts in Jos, the following recommendations are of necessity:

- Politics should be used to unite disparate groups, rather than used to amplify group differences for political gains.
- Privileges attached to political offices should be reduced to make them less attractive. Since conflict in the area revolves mainly around competition for political power, whosoever comes to power should see the entire area as his/her constituency and treat all the people as his own.
- There is need to revisit the status of the Jos North Local Government Council to make it more representative and reflect the wishes of all the communities in a way that

- will bring about unity and a sense of belongingness.
- Government should implement the recommendations of the various panels especially those that will promote inclusiveness, equity and justice.
- Investigation into the degree of culpability of persons involved in violence and killings in Jos should be conducted and perpetrators punished accordingly.
- National Assembly should revisit the constitutional

clause bordering on the vest issue of indigene provision in the 1999 constitution with the aim of emphasizing common citizenship based on residency.

Finally, there is need to build the culture of peace and tolerance in inter-group interaction. The security forces charged with the responsibility of quelling violence in Jos should be well composed and not deployed based on ethnic or religious considerations, so as not to give room for ethnic sentiment in the discharge of their duties.

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