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Civil Society Actors and Broadcast Media Muzzling in Ghana's Northern Region

Amin Alhassan¹, Felix Odartey-Wellington²
& Abdul-Fatawu Shaibu³

¹University for Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana
amin.dada@gmail.com (Correspondence)

²Cape Breton University, Sydney (Nova Scotia), Canada

³University of Development Studies, Tamale, Ghana

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Abstract: This work widens the trajectory of research in media ethics and performance in West Africa by examining the role violence plays in the way civil society actors relate with journalists in Ghana's Northern Region. Findings from in-depth interviews with broadcast stations' staff in the region show that they adhere to the principle of self-censorship to avoid attacks, not from the expected sources of overzealous government agents or overbearing media owners, but some civil society actors. The experiences of broadcasters in the Tamale metropolis indicate that the intimidation of journalists on duty is still a common occurrence, their compliance with some ethical principles notwithstanding. One ramification of this is that government agencies and media stakeholders, professional associations, in particular, must wake up to the responsibility of protecting the interests of journalists in all areas, press freedom inclusive.

Keywords: Media freedom, civil society actors, violence, censorship, Northern Ghana.

Introduction

Like previous works (e.g. Tetey, 2001; Diedong, 2016; Nyarko and Akpojivi, 2017), this study assumes that freedom of the press is essential to the proper functioning of Ghana's growing democracy, especially in the context of the Habermasian public sphere. It also assumes that the press informs citizen participation in the nation's democracy, and acts as a watchdog on the State and powerful interests.

Therefore, the Ghana's 2018 *Reporters Without Borders'* ranking as number one in Africa and 23 in the world in terms of press freedom and celebrated as a remarkable achievement (Reporters Without Borders, 2018) may be epistemologically fragile. The generalized perspectives on the freedom enjoyed by the media do obfuscate the contrasting realities in some parts of the country.

We assert in this study that media freedom is currently attenuated in the Northern Region of Ghana in a manner that is peculiar and deserves scholarly attention. Precisely, this study speaks to the phenomenon whereby civil society elements forcibly weaken broadcast media freedom in the Northern Region and consequently, the effects of same on the ability of broadcast media to function

effectively as a Habermasian public sphere. As conceptualized by Habermas (1989), the public sphere is a space outside the control of the State and corporate interests wherein citizens can freely engage in discourse about matters of public interest. The voice in the public sphere is, therefore, a critical rather than deferential voice. Habermas idealized the space of an active, participative 18th-century bourgeois public sphere in contrast to the elite-dominated contemporary commodified and corporatized public spheres. This idealized public sphere is, therefore, the standard against which an active, critical mass media is measured.

As Avle notes of the radio medium, "It plays a preeminent role in Ghana's broadcast mediascape, compared to television and the print media" (2011, p.4). Owing to factors such as literacy rates, internet penetration, portability and unreliable power supply (Walsh, 2017), radio is the dominant mass medium in Ghana (Mu-azu and Shivram, 2017) with almost 63 percent of the audience share (MFWA, 2017). The Northern Regional capital of Tamale and its environs are awash with local FM stations, ranging from State-owned public service-oriented stations to commercial, community, and campus radio stations (Mu-azu and Shivram, 2017). The city of Tamale is a fast-growing cosmopolitan

center of northern Ghana (Phyfferoen, 2012). It has historically been a political capital, from the pre-independence Northern Territories days to the post-colonial period and the evolution of the current configuration of the Northern Region. Following the liberalization of the airwaves in the nineties, which made private ownership of broadcasting undertakings possible (Boateng, 2009; Walsh, 2017), radio has contributed to Tamale's cosmopolitanism and of the 48 officially licensed radio stations in the region, 27 operate from Tamale or adjacent districts with the Tamale urban space as the targeted market. There has never been any sustained publication of print media from Tamale as all the newspapers tend to originate in southern Ghana with limited circulation in the north.

Field research conducted in the northern regions (Savannah, Northern, North East, Upper East, and Upper West Regions) showed that the radio continues to be the primary source of information for most rural folks in the Northern Region. About 89.56 percent of males and 87 percent of females indicated they were using the radio as their primary source of information (Alhassan et.al, 2016, p.33). The majority of the radio

broadcasts are transmitted from the studios in either Tamale or nearby Savelugu, Sagnarigu, Tolon, and Kumbungu Districts. Drawing on public sphere literature (e.g. Habermas, 1989; Boateng, 2009; Nyarko, 2016), it can be said that radio is part of the nation's *media ecology* and thus constitutes a critical space for public discourse in Ghana.

The Problem Statement

In the recent times, there have been some reported attacks on radio stations in and around Tamale, with consequences such as media workers sustaining injuries, interruption of live broadcasts, and destruction of broadcast equipment or vehicles of on-air panel discussants. The origins of the practice of studio attacks may be difficult to establish, but the most dramatic and most visible was a March 11, 2014 incident at Radio Justice in Tamale (Gadugah, 2014), which has been dubbed the microcosm of these attacks. Radio Justice was again attacked on December 2, 2017 (MFWA, 2017). This occurrence is significant because the attacks are traceable not to the usual culprits – government agents – but non-State actors.

These problematic occurrences have impacted program schedules, choice of talk show topics, the

willingness of radio guests to engage in panel discussions on sensitive subjects and the readiness of station managers to enforce a form of self-censorship for their stations. There is also a growing perception in and around Tamale that radio is not just a site for the contestation of ideas leading to the formation of public opinion in a typical Habermasian sense of the public sphere (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; Garnham, 2007) but that it is also fertile ground for growing the seeds of violent conflict. This perception was reinforced by a National Peace Council Conflict Map synopsis of 2008 which noted that:

In the Tamale metropolis, political conflicts occurred in Gumbihini, Choggu, and Changli as a result of political rivalries between the two main parties. The conflict was pre-election violence between supporters of the NDC (National Democratic Congress) and the NPP (New Patriotic Party) in which 26 houses were burnt in the Choggu Hill Top and Choggu Manayili areas. The conflict emanated from a radio station discussion between the activists of the two main political parties. It resulted in an argument between butchers in the Tamale Central Market. This led to a conflict among the butchers which resulted in

the death of a colleague butcher who was an NDC sympathizer. The NDC organized, attacked and burnt the home of one of the panelists on the radio discussion who was seen as an NPP person. (National Peace Council, 2018).

From this National Peace Council synopsis, one gathers that exercising speech rights during a radio panel discussion makes discussants vulnerable to physical attacks. This means that any audience member who feels aggrieved by radio discussions could resort to violence instead of using legal means of redress such as rejoinders, rebuttals or litigation.

Literature Review: The State, Capital, and Civil Society Vortex and the Media

One remarkable feature of Ghana's Fourth Republican Constitution is the extensive provisions it makes for the protection of media freedoms. Chapter 12 of the Constitution is entirely devoted to "Freedom and Independence of the Media" and has six provisions guaranteeing the independence of the media, proscribing censorship, and establishing that no law shall be made to require publishers to be licensed. It guarantees the right to rejoinder as a means of compensating for media excesses. The chapter also states that "editors

and publishers of newspapers and other institutions of the mass media shall not be subject to control or interference by government, nor shall they be penalized or harassed for their editorial opinions and views, or the content of their publications” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Article 4). Article 5 adds that “All agencies of the mass media shall, at all times, be free to uphold the principles, provisions, and objectives of this Constitution, and shall uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government to the people of Ghana” (Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Article 5).

The 1992 Constitution was produced against the backdrop of a consistent record of governmental interference, and control of media in Ghana. The country had recently experienced a decade of military dictatorship and what is described as a consequent “culture of silence” (Ankomah, 1987; Serlomey, 2012: p.2; Odartey-Wellington et al, 2017, p.304). Thus, the constitutional provisions referenced are crafted to protect the citizens’ media rights from State abuse. It would appear therefore that the private sector entrepreneur who invests in media industries and civil society actors, amongst others, was never envisioned by this constitution as a potential abuser of media freedoms. Thus, the URL: <http://journals.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/index.php/cjoc>

protection of media freedoms, to the extent that the citizen’s abilities to transmit and receive mass media content are safeguarded, is concerned with threats from the State - with the government and its coercive apparatus as potential threat sources. Hence, it appears justifiable to focus on the State and its agents as the potential abusers of press freedom. The Media Foundation for West Africa’s (MFWA) periodic *West Africa Free Expression Monitor* has since 2014 corroborated this in its reports (See <http://www.mfwa.org/publication-type/reports/>). Abusers of media freedom in this context have the intention of attenuating media agency and re-structuring journalistic practice by forcibly limiting the scope of media discourse or shaping public discourse in the media.

Using the MFWA published data on violations of media freedom in West Africa for the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 (MFWA 2014; MFWA 2015; MFWA 2016), the following chart is constructed to graphically present threats from dimensions of a democratic society, namely the State, Capital and Civil Society. The MFWA data isolates 8 actors for tabulating sources of threats to media freedoms. These are 1. Police/Security forces, 2. State officials, 3. Regulatory bodies, 4. Political party affiliates,

5. Media owners, 6. Organized groups, 7. Courts and 8. Other individuals. We found out that these categories can be re-grouped into the three blocs of *State*, *Capital* and *Civil Society*. Thus, in our re-configuration, we grouped police/security forces, state officials, courts and regulatory bodies, into *State and State apparatus agents*. The category of

media owners was retained as a category for *Capital*. Political party affiliates, organized groups, and other individuals constituted the category of *Civil Society*. Thus in this reconfigured typology, the following is the outcome of the re-tabulation of the MFWA data into the State, Capital (media owners), and Civil Society for West Africa.




Figure 1: Composite Chart of Violations of Media in West Africa

In Figure 1, the State remains the dominant abuser of media freedom in all countries of West Africa, except Burkina Faso. The situation in Ghana is consistent with the West African pattern. However, the record of civil society actors is quite revealing in terms of the emerging threats to media freedoms and this is what this work focuses

on. The experience of the Northern Region, being used as a case study in this paper thus allows highlighting civil society as an unexpected emerging threat to media freedoms.

Johan Galtung’s (1999) model of media and society offers a normative framework whereby the

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media is located in a hegemonic triangular vortex constituted by State, Capital and Civil Society. We draw on this framework to understand the condition of the media in Ghana's democracy. In Galtung's formulation, the three units of society compete to exert influence on the media, as it is the channel of public communication (1999, p.9). Where a strong State exists, the media is likely to gravitate toward State interests. This can be in the form of exclusive State ownership of the media or fear of the coercive power of the State, both of which were observable in Ghana before media liberalization (Hasty, 2005). Referencing Habermas (1989), an inference can be made from those circumstances, for example, that "the State-owned media played a 'representational' rather than a critical function vis-à-vis State

power" (Odartey-Wellington et al, 2017, p.304). In an environment of a strong Market/Capital dominance over State and Civil Society, the media would be seen as being subservient to the wishes of corporate interests through the power of advertising funds or the ownership structures (McChesney, 2015).

In Galtung's taxonomy, Civil Society appears to be the weakest of these three institutional elements (1999, p.12). One of the reasons why Galtung considers the category of Civil Society to be weak is that both the State and Market equally have representation in Civil Society in the form of Civil Society organizations (CSOs) and adjuncts. We diagrammatically represent Galtung's model as follows to demonstrate the triangular vortex.




Figure 2: Diagram of Media in a State, Market and Civil Society vortex

Literature abounds on how the State and Capital leverage power to dominate or influence the media (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 2015; Mentan, 2015; Ogola, 2017; Mwakideu, 2017; Kruger, 2017). But there is little focus on how Civil Society elements shape media content or practice. This study adopts the position that the impact of Civil Society actors on media freedoms also deserves attention. This is pertinent concerning the recent dynamics observable in the Northern Region of Ghana.

For about a decade, while State actors in the region have largely respected media freedoms, Civil Society actors have emerged as a new source of systemic and

structural media repression. Lately, almost all radio stations located in the vicinity of the regional capital Tamale have adopted self-censorship strategies to avoid provoking diverse vigilante groups including political militias, activists, sports or religious fanatics, and partisans in chieftaincy conflicts. This study, therefore, focuses on the activities of civil society elements that are prone to use of violence in their dealings with the media and the ramification of this violent behavior in Ghana's Northern Region.

Objectives of the study

The objectives of this study are the following:

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1. To examine the media-violence nexus, the impact of this nexus, including how it shapes the practice of journalism and media work in the Northern Region of Ghana.
2. To verify the anecdotal evidence that the specter of violence from either known or unknown Civil Society groups has led to deliberate acts of media self-censorship.

Research questions

The questions framing this research are:

1. What is the extent and impact of civil society actor-initiated violence on the media in the Northern Region?
2. How are media gatekeepers responding to the phenomenon of civil society-led violence on the media?
3. Have certain topics become taboo for news coverage or commentary due to the specter of violent attacks from Civil Society elements?

Rationale and Significance of the Study

The focus on the Northern Region is important not just because of the region's significance to the overall health of the nation but also because of its geographical distance from what is concerned the political and economic center of the nations. There is a legitimate concern that

the issues identified in the paper may not be adequately accounted for by policy-makers. As well, historically, northern Ghana has suffered from economic and developmental disparities vis-à-vis the southern regions and the absence of a vibrant media environment potentially exacerbates these disparities. One of the consequences of these disparities is that the region is also home to civil society-based 'vigilante' groups, often mobilized for violent action (Oteng-Ababio, 2016), including threats to the media. This study contributes to discussions on how Civil Society actors are increasingly becoming sources of the challenges that media face in the course of their duties.

Method

In-depth interviews were conducted with the management members of nine local radio stations, as well as 15 reporters in the Tamale vicinity between January and March 2018. The study also included interviews with law enforcement officers on factors that militate against the successful investigation of violent crimes against the media in the area. Table 1 below is the list of media houses whose staff were interviewed.

Table 1: List of Radio Stations whose journalists were interviewed

	Name of station	Category and ownership
1.	Zaa Radio	Private/ commercial
2.	Radio Savannah	State/Public service
3.	Radio Justice	Private/Commercial
4.	Diamond FM	Private /Commercial
5.	Might FM	Private /Commercial
6.	North Star	Private/Commercial
7.	Fila FM	Private/Commercial
8.	Bishara Radio	Private/Commercial
9.	Tawasul Radio	Community

The focus of the study crystallized out of an attempt to understand why local FM stations increasingly avoided comprehensive coverage of certain issues.

In 2017, the frequency of abuse of media escalated. The following is a list of some of the discursive moments which were used as reference points for the interviews:

- April 4, 2017, a radio DJ was lured to a location and assaulted for making what was considered derogatory comments about local video/film actors.
- August 24, 2017, *Tawasul Community FM* was attacked, staff assaulted and equipment vandalized leading to the unscheduled termination of a live sports program.
- September 4, 2017, an NDC communicator was assaulted at *Bishara Radio* for comments

he made during a live program.

- December 2, 2017, *Radio Justice* was attacked, equipment vandalized and a panelist assaulted during a live discussion on Dagbon chieftaincy issues. The transmission was terminated. For *Radio Justice*, this was a repeat of the March 11, 2014 attack during which vehicles and property were torched in an apparent protest against a live panel discussion broadcast.

All these cases were reported to law enforcement but investigations stalled as no prosecutions were carried out. Several other threats of violence have led to the termination of broadcasts but were not been reported to law enforcement. In all of these cases, we saw that neither agents of the State nor Capital were involved. However, in all cases, we

identified Civil Society agents as perpetrators.

Findings and Discussion

A common thread in the responses analyzed in this study suggests that the phenomenon of organized violence against the media from Civil Society groups is real. The staff and management of the nine radio stations acknowledged that this jeopardizes the independence of the media in and around Tamale. A journalist at *Radio Justice* said: "When you come across a story on certain topics in the region, you have to ask yourself if your editor or manager will allow you to work on it." In response to a complementary question asking why he said: "It is for the security of the station and myself." The specter of insecurity here is in reference not to the State or Capital, but Civil Society actors.

Radio Justice has been attacked three times since 2004. On all three occasions, the management of the station has claimed that the attackers were unknown. One interviewee said: "No. As for that one, we don't know them; we address them as unknown persons that came. In all the three, the first one it was a media war, the second one they were many so we couldn't identify them - like a community coming to attack" (*Radio Justice* Interview). The failure or inability

to identify perpetrators does not appear to be an accurate answer from the interviewee. Earlier in the interview, he had admitted that Tamale is a place where "everybody knows everyone." In an environment of impunity and intricate social relations, identifying the perpetrators is itself is a security hazard (Odartey-Wellington et al, 2017).

Thus, the inability of a media executive to publicly identify perpetrators of media violence is a function of the dominance of Civil Society elements in muzzling the media, which is not guaranteed protection by law enforcement. The responses of some of the journalists interviewed corroborated the perception that the perpetrators are known. It is the fear of being identified as a whistle-blower or 'snitch' that keeps them from putting on record with the identities of perpetrators. And in some instances, the perpetrators keep their records of notoriety as a badge of honor and would remind peers or opponents of such records. Indeed, in the arson attacks on *Radio Justice* depicted in the following images, the identities of the arsonists were common knowledge, but neither law enforcement nor the victims were willing to pursue the matter through a judicial process.



Figure 3: Images of violence and arson visited on a media house in Tamale (Source: Management of Radio Justice)

All the 15 journalists interviewed agreed about the existence of an unofficial list of taboo topics. The commonly identified topic was Dagbon chieftaincy issues. Specifically, debates about chieftaincy issues, particularly those that bordered on *Abudu* and *Andani* were seen as clear taboos. The subject of traditional politics is also articulated to national partisan politics and lines are often blurred when attacks occur. What is clear,

however, is that these attacks occur and are driven by audience grievances over the content. The Manager of *North Star FM* in the interview reported that the station has experienced two attacks in recent years even though checks with the police disclosed three attacks on the record. According to the manager:

I'm a management member and only came to manage this place from June this year but the previous

managers or directors were attacked. The station started at the road leading to the School of Hygiene thus the Zogyiri area. People besieged the place throwing stones. I can't remember when, though that was the first time. The second attack was about two years ago. I've always been a director of the company but because of certain crises here I was brought in to streamline things. One attack was in the day time but we fought them back. One of them [the attackers] was late to start his motorcycle ... and they took to their heels. Certain discussions were going on here concerning chieftaincy and other things and I think they didn't like it.

Alhaji Aliu Mahama, Vice President of Ghana from 2000-2008, established *North Star FM* as a private venture while he was in office. It was during his tenure that Ya Na Yakubu Andani II, the traditional king of Dagbon and several people were killed in what was seen as a chieftaincy clash (see endnote 3). It was seen by many as an *Abudu* attack on the *Andani* faction of the Dagbon traditional governance. This was because the *Abudus* were regarded as being pro-NPP and the *Andanis*, pro-NDC. The popular perception also was that the NPP, and by extension,

Mahama, was sympathetic to the *Abudu* cause (Albert, 2008, p.52). The *North Star FM* station was therefore seen as an *Abudu* platform. As the station's manager put it: "You see, this station is branded as *Abudu* and an NPP sympathizer so there were supporters of NDC who did that [the attack on the station] ... Because if people are discussing things and they are not insulting anybody, just a general discussion like the *Radio Justice* one, and you don't like what is being discussed do you have to attack? You don't do that."

National politics and traditional politics are not the only precursors of radio station attacks in Tamale. On August 24, 2017, an official of Tamale local football club attacked the host of a live program at *Tawasul Community FM* for discussing match-fixing allegations against the club. The official was invited to phone-in or come to the studio to respond to the match-fixing allegations. He, however, attended at the station with two well-built minders (hired thugs colloquially referred to in Ghana as "macho men") to violently attack the host for daring to mention his name on air. This was reported to the police while the host was evacuated to the hospital.

The next day, the errant official brought in some community leaders to apologize for his actions and agreed to pay compensation for the trauma suffered by the vhost and equipment damage. According to the management, the arbitration process was facilitated by the police, a claim that the police did not corroborate when we interviewed them. The police, however, confirmed that parties in these cases were often reluctant to opt for a criminal prosecution, rather favoring amicable settlements that are not precluded under the Ghanaian criminal law if the offenses fall in the realm of misdemeanors. In more serious cases, the police admit being unable to apprehend culprits due to the lack of community cooperation. Interestingly, the promise of compensation in the *Tawasul* case did not materialize and it appears that the police have discontinued with the case. To the extent that debt-collection is not a remit of law enforcement, the police argued that their options are limited when parties default on amicable settlements in this context.

Management staff interviewed acknowledged that they take precautionary measures to ensure that they do not offend certain identified community elements for fear of incurring their wrath. Of the 15 journalists we talked to, only

two claimed that their work is unaffected by the fear of these community elements. The two agree that when their copy is not included in bulletins by their local stations due to concerns about potential Civil Society taboo topics, they send these stories for use by media organizations outside the region. Acknowledging this implies the existence within their local stations of regulatory practices (that could be categorized as self-censorship) as a result of the *de facto* 'regulatory' regime imposed on them by Civil Society elements. One manager of an FM station, after requesting anonymity before the interview, said "We do not do local programming. We give the news and do sports and then national politics and music. No local issues." Asked why he said: "The local people are not predictable. If you imagine what has happened to other stations in the past for very simple issues, you wonder what *koraa* (at all) is wrong with them."

From the responses of both journalists and the management, the list of subjects considered taboo includes chieftaincy issues, controversies over sports, and issues that engage linkages between traditional and national political cleavages. Interestingly, while the NPP is branded *Abudu* and the NDC is seen as being *Andani-*

biased, these perceived alliances are social constructions and do not mean that all members of each of the parties identify with the corresponding chieftaincy faction. Consequently, strictly speaking, partisan political discussions are not considered sensitive enough to cause media to engage in self-censorship. The partisan political discussion becomes problematic and toxic only when they are connected to local chieftaincy politics. Yet, while these matters appear to be provocative, they are also very important topics of discussion. A failure to discuss them openly does not wish them away. On the contrary, these issues have often materialized as social implosions that have negatively impacted socio-economic development in the North (IRIN 2003).

While this study confirms the existence of Civil Society censorship of media as a phenomenon in the Northern Region, it also suggests a failure of the State to guarantee the safety of broadcasters in the Tamale metropolis, and confirms the suggestion by study respondents of the existence of a state of impunity. As the manager of Radio Justice noted, "if you [the State] don't arrest, how then do you start a judicial process?" Further, he suggested a reticence by media

owners to expose media holdings to economic loss resulting either from loss of advertising revenue when broadcasts are suspended, when equipment and infrastructure are damaged, or when budget lines have to be created for target hardening as a security measure. Another manager starkly also noted, "we can't afford security for 24 hour-service [-programming]." As the manager of *Tawasul Radio* added:

In the Northern Region, Tamale *per se*, we the media houses are in trouble. I think though I'm yet to meet other media personnel to set up a union should something like this happen they can fight for the affected people. The absence of the union is making people attack media houses because no one is there to fight for us, Tamale is becoming unbecoming that people take the law into their hands and do whatever they want. And the media plays a greater responsibility in this particular region but I don't know why they don't regard us. So either the problem is coming from us or just within the region itself, the higher authority has emboldened them. For instance, just three days ago, the same thing happened to *Justice FM* and when the issue came up it is like one

particular gate... came and did that which is alarming and something must be done. There should be a collective responsibility like a union. There should be a rule to protect the interest of media houses.

While this approach could be helpful, it is curious that broadcast media workers are oblivious to the function of the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA) in protecting members in all regions. In all of these occurrences in the Northern Region, the GJA appeared to be a distant factor in the equation, signaling a need for the body to refocus its efforts in ensuring the protection of broadcast media workers in that part of Ghana. The current practice of self-censorship is inconsistent with media norms as a fourth estate and public sphere. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the Habermas' conceptualization of the public sphere as an unfettered space for public discourse anchored in civil society.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study has engaged with the phenomenon whereby civil society elements forcibly attenuate press freedom in the Northern Region, consequently, curtailing the ability of broadcast media to function effectively as a *Habermasian* public sphere. We have shown that

broadcasters in Tamale were compelled to engage in self-censorship to avoid attracting violent attacks from the civil society characters, thereby expanding the trajectory of media censorship research beyond the paradigm of state or capital dominance over the media.

This study confirms Nyarko and Akpojivi's (2017) observation that provocation often lies at the root of the media intimidation and attacks in Ghana to the extent that, in the context of this study, some audiences object to reportage or discussions of certain topics on the radio in Tamale. What is intriguing is that this study is against the backdrop of Ghana's celebration as an African success story concerning media freedom. While we did not set out to examine the methodology of the Reporters Without Borders' ranking, a cursory view of its 87-question instrument of evaluation is heavily skewed at identifying abuses perpetrated by the State. As noted in the review of Ghana's Constitution, the focus on the state as a likely abuser of press freedoms can obfuscate non-state actors who are emerging sources of media freedom abuses. It is against this backdrop that we recommend that:

1. The law enforcement agencies should always act in cases of attacks on media in the

Northern Region and media should publicize these attacks as well as the status of resultant law enforcement action (or lack of action).

2. The GJA should play an active role in acting against impunity and ensuring law enforcement accountability. They should be seen as the protectors of the interest of their members.

3. As captured in the interviews, the sense of impunity is the strongest factor creating the state of insecurity that Tamale broadcasters are experiencing. That, therefore, should be the focus of the government's intervention if local broadcasters are to function effectively.

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