

Security Algorithm for Preventing Malicious Attacks in Software Defined Network (SDN)

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Abstract—This paper explores the success record of the Internet as well as its shortcoming in the area of network configuration, response to fault(s), load and change(s) that led to the concept of Software Defined Network (SDN). These are the factors that separated combined network's control from forwarding planes for easier optimization, programming of network and centralization of control logic capabilities. These had also led to new different challenges, that open doors for new threats that were not existing or harder to exploit. SDN prototype embraces third-party improvements as a result of hard work, that later makes the SDN vulnerable to potential trust issue on its applications (apps). This makes it possible for an intruder to insert malicious content/programs into the network packets and then forward into the network. Codes were written to implement the designed algorithm using white/blacklist source identification combined with Hash Bayes' Theorem (W/B+HBT) content filter as a security measure to prevent the malicious attack(s). It was shown that new transaction(s) from known attack source(s) are classified as Blacklist and dropped, while those known as whitelist are forwarded to their respective destination as a legitimate packet(s) (W/B). Those from unknown sources were treated using Hash Bayes' Theorem (HBT) content filter. The result of the implementation is able to record 10% false

positive (FP) and false negative (FN) and 90% true positive (TP) and true negative (TN) (accurate classification of packets) for the presented algorithm.

Keywords/Index Terms— OpenFlow, Flow table, Control plane, Hash Bayes' Theorem, Security Algorithm

1. Introduction

Software Defined Network (SDN) is an emerging innovative technology for enabling open programmable network environment to realize network with efficient and dynamic nature. It is dynamic, manageable, inexpensive network components and high-speed network emerging services according (Yutaka, Hung-Hsuan & Kyoji, 2013 and Raphael, Dietmar & Mark, 2015). Before the advent of dynamic nature SDN, the complexities of traditional computer networks were being managed with the adding of more protocols suites to meet up with the required expectation despite its complexity according to (Muhammad *et al.*, 2014). Open Networking Foundation (ONF) is a profitless organization dedicated to the development, standardization, and commercialization of SDN according to (Wenfeng *et al.*, 2015). However, the openness of the SDN has resulted in security challenges that could jeopardize its purpose of existence if left unaddressed. This had made security a major concern for SDN, as a result of its distinguishing features, conventional network security approaches cannot be directly applied. For the fact that SDN improves network performance, yet it creates some peculiar challenges due to its centralized control and programmability features. It introduces security control challenges (Diego *et al.*, 2013; Phillip *et al.*, 2012; Ali *et al.*, 2015) in Matthew, Mahamadou *et al.*, (2016). SDN can be seen as an eye-catching honeypot for intruders and a source of challenges for less equipped network operators such

as amplified prospective for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. OpenFlow is exposed to man-in-the-middle attacks when Transport Layer Security (TLS) is not used and network breaches may result when network controllers are shared by multiple users or applications (Ali *et al.*, 2015) in (Matthew, Mahamadou & Sarhan, 2016). Rapid changes in position and strength of flows requires flexible move toward successful network resource(s) management, various number of devices such as smartphones, tablets, and notebooks had increased much fold to put pressure on enterprise resources to bring about rapid changes to network resources and as such security challenge to the management of Quality of Service (QoS) (Muhammad *et al.*, 2014).

Internet with the use of traditional IP based protocol has exploited its functionality and there is a need for a network paradigm that will take the network to a new level, suitable for today's demand of internet and its functionality. Software Defined Network (SDN) promised potential basic change in network configuration and real-time traffic management performed (Taimur, 2017). It separates between the network control plane and the data plane, which provides user applications with a centralized view of the distributed network states (Ian *et al.*, 2016). It moves the control plane outside the switches and enables an external centralized control of data through a logical software entity known as the SDN controller., it decouples software from hardware and centralizes

network state in the control layer (Ianet *al.*, 2016). This makes the network administration, provisioning, arrangement, resource optimization, and network protection flexible using robotic SDN programs (Vandana, 2016). This enables researchers and practitioners to design much easier, flexible and powerful innovative network functions and protocols called SDN (Seungwonet *al.*, 2013). It enables direct programming of network operation(s) using an ordinary computer, programmer, operating system and programming languages. SDNs are logically segmented on three general regions:

Application layer this is the management plane responsible for the network programming section. Control layer hosting the network intelligent and Data layer (Bruce & Rossi, 2016).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is the background of the work, Section 3 introduces the framework for preventing Software Defined Networks (SDN) from Malicious Attacks, Section 4 describes the result derived from the given framework in Section 3. Finally, an important conclusion is discussed in Section 5.




Figure 1: Overview of Software Defined Network (Sdn) (Okunade & Osunade, 2014)

2. Background of the Work

2.1. Northbound Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)

This is an open source-based application interface representing the software interface between the software modules of the controller platform and the SDN applications. The northbound interface facilitates the operation by providing the abstract view of the underlying network

and empower the direct expression of network behavior and requirements.

2.2. Application Plane/Layer

Application plane is the topmost SDN plane that process request of incoming traffic and request services from the lower layers on behalf of the received traffic for further processing (Hrshikesh, 2015) is composed of network service applications, business

services, security services, and others that benefit from abstracted global view of the network according to their own purposes (Cabajet *al.*,2014).this is an example of Northbound Application Programming Interfaces.

2.3. Control Plane

Control Plane handle the network intelligence control and states, it implement the network policies to globally regulate the network states and activities of the SDN. The logical centralization of controller enabled better decision making and maintaining of a global view of the entire network (Chienhung, Kuochen, and Guocin, 2017). It is the brain behind the successful execution of any SDN activities. According to Daojing, Sammy and Mohsen (2016), control plane manages the configuration of networking devices (such as switches and routers) and their forwarding functions. The data plane consists of protocols to execute the forwarding functions according to the rules configured by the control plane protocols. SDN controller is the central point of the network that enables the administrator to apply custom policies/protocols across the network hardware; control plane directs the data plane on flow forwarding and modifications processes. The controller is accountable for the conversion of applications' orders to the lower level communication protocol used by the data plane devices(Cabajet *al.*,2014). The most widely deployed controller is a network operating system (NOX), controller. Nagaet *al.* (2015) made to understand that controller can exercise it dynamic nature to modified the switchesthrough commands to adjust to traffic requests and equipment failures that may be observed through an event.

2.4. Southbound Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)

This is an interface through which the controllers are able to communicate with the network devices such as switches and data plane.It empowers the direct expression of network behavior and requirements. A controller can implement its responsibilities on data plane by communicating its command to the data plane through the southbound such as changing of forwarding behavior of a switch through altering offlow rule. Southbound Application Interface (APIs) are communication protocols between the controllers and the data planes examples are;OpenFlow (SDN most widely used communication protocol), OVSDB, OpenDaylight, Onix and HP VAN, and so on.

2.5. OpenFlow(OF)

OpenFlow communicate between the SDN controller via southbound open interfaces (such as OF protocol)and the data plane.OFwas created and hosted at the University of Stanford in 2008 for evangelizing and supporting the OpenFlow Community. OpenFlow is the most widely used SDN protocol; it is an open standard based communication protocol that enables the control plane to communicate with the data plane according to (Mateus, Bruno and Katia, 2013).Wolfgang and Michael (2014) stated that OpenFlow mainly focuses its consideration on switches whereas other SDN approaches focused on other network elements such as routers. According to Jad, David, Covington, Guido and Nick (2008) OpenFlow pushes difficulty to controller software so that the controller administrator has full control over it. This is done by pushing forwarding decisions to a "logically" centralized controller and allowing the controller to add and

remove forwarding entries in OpenFlow switches.

3. Algorithm and Implementation

3.1. Methodology

To address the aforementioned problem, a code was written to implement the Security Algorithm presented with embedded security extension of SDN OTable rule (figure 2). This introduced security control extending the SDN flow table with black/white list, which helped to secure SDN paradigm, where control plane will check for the authentication of users' application through the API for user's confirmation using white / blacklist for legitimacy confirmation of users' request who is requesting to make use of control plane by sending signals.

3.2. White / Black List plus Hash Bayes theorem (W/B+HBT) Algorithm Model

Figure 3 is the W/B+HBT Security Algorithm for preventing malicious attacks in Software Defined Network and process model that shows the incoming packet/request from the network, parsing the header field and match against the flow table to check if flow rule is already presented for the source address. If checked result is (NO)

it means no existing flow rule for the packet source address, implying that packet/request source is communicating with that particular destination for the first time. The algorithm then requests from the controller for the creation of new flow rule for the newly arrived request packet transmitting from an unknown source. If the test checked result is (YES) it means there is an existing flow rule between the source and destination of the newly arrived packet requesting from the network. The algorithm further its test to check if the identified flow rule between the basis and target of requesting packet is enlisted within the black or white list security extension of the SDN OF Architecture. If the flow rule is within the white list, the transaction is successfully executed by adding an entry for it in each of the switches along the path. Otherwise (if the flow rule falls within the blacklist), the algorithm generates an alarm that is sent to the controller and it also replies by sending a drop action to block or discard the transaction




Figure 2:Extended SDN Openflow (Of) Table with White/Blacklist Security Features




Figure 3: W/B+HBT Algorithm Model

If otherwise (newly arrived Packet source) not in either Black/White list, then the algorithm applies HBT content-based filter to calculate the Malicious chances of the incoming packet using statistical Bayes' theorem (Okunade & Osunade, 2014). If (Malicious value) less than (<) the set Threshold of 0.5 the

packet is forwarded/delivered to the appropriate quarters. If the packet calculated Malicious chance/value is greater than (>) the set Threshold of 0.5 the packet is discarded. Whatever the case may be the result is used to update the white/blacklist for a subsequent transaction(s).

S/NO	TOKEN	SPAMICITY
1	Kin	0.997472
2	Lottery	0.997362
3	Top	0.99529
4	Email	0.992583
5	Million	0.992052
6	Win	0.991283
7	Account	0.98367
8	Invested	0.983607
9	10.1.1.27	0.4
10	259.11.24.18	0.4
11	Abacha	0.642038
12	Abiodun	0.247848
13	Aber	0.19774
14	All	0.409717
15	And	0.5
16	Another	0.296899
17	App2.incamail.com	0.4
18	Are	0.404241

Figure 4: Some Suspicious Tokens and Associated Spamicity /Malicious Values

3.3. Word Hashing Operation

Word hashing operation is foremost executed on the newly arrived packet content, this is the removal of all unwanted prefixes, affixes and suffixes in the word(s) in order to deal with actual root/real word. The security algorithm contains inbuilt word hashing filtering technique that removed all unwanted prefixes, affixes and suffixes special characters used around the word(s) (especially around the suspicious terms) by intruders to misspelled/manipulate/modified/mismanage tokens (such as \$, /, \, |, =, !, @, #, %, ^, &, , (,), <, >, ?, :, ", ', {, [, },] and so on) used to foil the filters. This is done on the words in order to deal with actual root/real word, needed to calculate the malicious chances value using the Bayes' theorem. Then, algorithm will match packet token one after the other against suspicious table's token (Figure 4) in the

database one after the other till the end of the suspicious table's token and then take the next token/word from the packet and do the same thing till the end of the tokens/words in the packet and match it against the list of tokens in the suspicious table. Then if there is matched the spamicity value of that particular matched token in the suspicious table (Figure 4) will be retrieved and assign against "a" been the first matched suspicious token follow by next matched identify suspicious term/token and assigned "b" been the second matched suspicious token, up to the last matched suspicious token and assigned it "z" is the last matched suspicious token. This assigned alphabet a to z are the alphabet finds in the Bayes formula, and spamicity values in (Figure 4) assigned to each of this alphabet (a-z) will be substituted into the Bayes formula as showed:

$$p(a,b,c...z) = \frac{a*b*c*.....*z}{a*b*c*.....*z + [(1-a)*(1-b)*(1-c)*.....*(1-z)]}$$

Then use the Bayes formula to calculate malicious chances, result gotten out of values substituted into the formula will then check against the threshold value that could set to any of: minimum with threshold value of 0.2, medium with threshold value of 0.3 and maximum with threshold value of 0.5 to give if (maliciousChances<= threshold) the entire newly arrived packet is forwarded to the appropriate port and then populate packet table of SDN database whitelist. But if otherwise (maliciousChances> threshold) the entire newly arrived packet is discarded and then populate a malicious table of SDN database blacklist.

4. Results and Discussion

This report the results of basic evaluation of a prototype implementation of Software Defined

Network (SDN) Security Access control Algorithm using PhP/HTML code, Running/loading the Algorithm is depicted in figure 5 below. It shows that the contents of flow table consist of previous transactions status between nodes that could be used to predict further transaction, it contain source and destination of transactions nodes IP and MAC addresses, action(s) performed on such transaction which could either be “drop” or “forward to the appropriate quarters”, security status that could be grouped into “blacklist” or “whitelist” and update status that signified if the flow table was initially populated at the starting point of implementation or updated by the application based on encountered during the execution of the application and also stated the date and time updated.

SNO	SOURCE IP	SOURCE MAC	DESTINATION IP	ACTION	SECURITY STATUS	UPDATE STATUS
1	192.168.1.1	08:00:42:54:00:02	192.168.1.2	Drop	Blacklist	Populate
2	192.168.1.2	08:00:42:54:00:02	192.168.1.1	Forward/Packet's Destination	Whitelist	Populate
3	192.168.1.3	08:00:42:54:00:03	192.168.1.4	Forward/Packet's Destination	Whitelist	Updated 15-08-2018 08:50:55
4	192.168.1.4	08:00:42:54:00:04	192.168.1.5	Forward/Packet's Destination	Whitelist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:00:10
5	192.168.1.5	08:00:42:54:00:05	192.168.1.6	Forward/Packet's Destination	Whitelist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:08:23
6	192.168.1.6	08:00:42:54:00:06	192.168.1.7	Forward/Packet's Destination	Whitelist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:16:28
7	192.168.1.7	08:00:42:54:00:07	192.168.1.8	Forward/Packet's Destination	Whitelist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:24:57
8	192.168.1.8	08:00:42:54:00:08	192.168.1.9	Packet's Drop	Blacklist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:30:02
9	192.168.1.9	08:00:42:54:00:09	192.168.1.8	Packet's Drop	Blacklist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:35:07
10	192.168.1.8	08:00:42:54:00:09	192.168.1.4	Packet's Drop	Blacklist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:40:16
11	192.168.1.8	08:00:42:54:00:09	192.168.1.7	Packet's Drop	Blacklist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:45:21
12	192.168.1.8	08:00:42:54:00:09	192.168.1.6	Packet's Drop	Blacklist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:50:27
13	192.168.1.8	08:00:42:54:00:09	192.168.1.5	Packet's Drop	Blacklist	Updated 15-08-2018 09:55:33
14	192.168.1.8	08:00:42:54:00:09	192.168.1.4	Packet's Drop	Blacklist	Updated 15-08-2018 10:00:37

Figure 5:View Flowtable

Malicious Inbox (Figure 6) is the list of received malicious packets, these are the list of incoming packets that are classified to be malicious rather than

been packet. They are an unwanted packet and identified to be dangerous. The experiment was able to successfully group the entire algorithm

tested malicious packets as such (malicious) therefore recorded 10%

false positive and false negative.

SNO	SOURCE IP	SOURCE MAC	DESTINATION IP	SUBJECT	DATETIME
1	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03
2	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03
3	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03
4	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03
5	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03
6	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03
7	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03
8	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Subject Line	2016-04-14 04:03

Figure 6: Malicious Inbox

Packet Inbox in Figure 7 is the list of received legitimate packets, these are the list of incoming packets that are classified to be legitimate rather than been malicious. The experiment was

able to successfully group the entire algorithm tested legitimate packets as such (legitimate) therefore recorded 90% true positive and negative.

SNO	SOURCE IP	SOURCE MAC	DESTINATION IP	SUBJECT	DATETIME
1	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	PERSON INFORMATION	2016-04-14 04:03
2	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	Person	2016-04-14 04:03
3	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	PERSON INFORMATION	2016-04-14 04:03
4	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	PERSON INFORMATION	2016-04-14 04:03
5	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	PERSON INFORMATION	2016-04-14 04:03
6	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	PERSON INFORMATION	2016-04-14 04:03
7	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	PERSON INFORMATION	2016-04-14 04:03
8	127.0.0.1	00-00-00-00-00-00	127.0.0.1	PERSON INFORMATION	2016-04-14 04:03

Figure 7: Packet Inbox

4.1. Evaluation of Algorithm with the Existing TopoGuard Security Method

In an existing TopoGuard Security Method in Figure 7, once a packet send to an host could be hijacked, subsequent packets supplied to that particular host

would be completely hijacked and redirected to the hijackers. The chart shown in figure 8 represents an evaluation of the White/Blacklist plus Hash Bayes Theorem (W/B + HBT) Algorithm with the Existing TopoGuard

Security where the two security methods were tested with the same data. The implemented Topoguard Security algorithm indicates that 80% legitimate and malicious packets were classified as True positive (+ve) and true negative (-ve) where 20% legitimate and malicious packets were classified as False positive

(+ve) and false negative (-ve). Whereas the White/Blacklist plus Hash Bayes Theorem (W/B + HBT) gives success record of 90% True positive (+ve) and true negative (-ve) and 10% record of False positive (+ve) and false negative (-ve) of legitimate and malicious packets classification.




Figure 8: Evaluation of Algorithm with the Existing Topoguard Security Method

4.2. Discussion of Result

The presented algorithm having combined three examination levels. White/Blacklist plus Hash Bayes Theorem (W/B + HBT) Algorithm implementation prevented false positive or negative packets from being present. Unlike the existing Topoguard security method that discovers and prevents packet(s) from being sent to a changed or modified host address/location only, but does not prevent the host address/location from being changed or modified. The algorithm (W/B + HBT) prevents the insecure source from sending a packet to the targeted host and also prevents insecure (malicious packet(s)) from been sent. Whereas the

existing Topoguard security method only considered already hijacked host (using source modification) from receiving the packet.

The result of evaluation of presented White/Blacklist plus Hash Bayes Theorem (W/B + HBT) security Algorithm compared against the existing Topoguard security Algorithm, recorded that the existing Topoguard security Algorithm has in its records 20% false positive and false negative and 80% true positive and true negative. Whereas the W/B + HBT Algorithm have the result of 10% false positive and false negative and 90% true positive and true negative, which is accurate packets classification

and far better, compared with the existing Topoguard security Algorithm.

5. Conclusion and Recommendation

5.1. Conclusion

This paper discussed in details the developed algorithm that prevents Software Defined Network (SDN) from malicious attack. As a proof of concept, it has been demonstrated and concluded from findings that algorithm combined source identification/authentication (using white/blacklist) and content filtering (using word hashing and Bayes' theorem) (W/B + HBT) method of malicious identification/authentication and packet grouping, provides effective solution to legitimate/malicious mail

identification/authentication and as such prevents malicious attack from accessing their targeted host in Software Defined Network. The experiment was a successful one recorded 10% false positive and false negative, and 90% true positive and true negative.

5.2. Recommendation

This paper recommends the use of combined methods of source identification using whitelist/blacklist combined with word hashing and Bayes' theorem for content filtering mechanisms/algorithm (W/B + HBT) as a preventive measure for intrusion prevention in Software Defined Network (SDN).

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